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Stereotype-consistency bias refers to the idea that people tend to remember stereotypical 
information about others better than non-stereotypical information (Fyock & Stangor, 1994). 
Limited research has examined how people may use stereotype-consistency bias when recalling 
information about LGBT characters in narratives (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll, 1981; 
McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). This line of research suggests that, 
instead of genuinely remembering stereotypical information better, participants tended to guess 
stereotypical answers to questions they do not know. In contrast to those studies, the experiment I 
conducted for this thesis suggests that heterosexual young adults tend to engage in stereotype 
inhibition, avoiding the use of gay and lesbian stereotypes. This may be due to a cohort effect, but 
future research is needed to determine the relevance of cognitive load and explicit homophobia. 
This information can be used for understanding how stereotyping occurs and developing 





 I’d like to thank David Copeland, my extremely patient thesis advisor. Many thanks to 
my lab-mates and the research assistants who have helped with the creation, materials, 
programming, coding, and administration of my experiments. Thanks to my professors at UNLV 
for the excellent teaching and constructive criticism I’ve received the last four years, especially 
my thesis committee: Rachael Robnett, Murray Millar, and Andrew Spivak. Huge thank you to 
Cody Grunwald and Natalie Vienup for being my best friends and helping me get through this. 
I’d also like to thank the scientists who have made research like this possible because of their 
contributions to psychological science: Patricia Devine, Gabriel Radvansky, Mark Snyder, David 




 This work is dedicated to those in the LGBTQ community who have endured hate crimes, 
bullying, and abuse because of their identity. We remember the many LGBTQ folks whose lives 
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Memory and Stereotypes for Lesbian/Gay Characters 
This thesis examines how people stereotype LGBT individuals (those who are lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, or transgender). As of 2017, at least one in 25 Americans1 identify as being LGBT 
(The Williams Institute, 2019), but prejudice and discrimination towards LGBT individuals 
widely exist in the United States (Callender, 2015; GLAAD, 2017) despite recent advances in 
LGBT rights such as the legalization of same-sex marriage (Pew Research Center, 2013). This 
prejudice can be harmful (Callender, 2015), especially for LGBT youth (Meyer, 2013). For 
example, experiencing homophobia can be very stressful, contributing to LGBT individuals 
having worse mental health with higher rates of suicide (see Meyer, 2013 for a review on 
homophobia; see McNeil, Ellis, & Eccles, 2017 for a review on transphobia). Further, it can 
relate to worse physical health, including increased risk of cardiovascular disease, respiratory 
issues, and other chronic health conditions (see Lick, Durso, & Johnson, 2013 for a review). 
Being prejudiced toward others is also potentially harmful; one study found that in 
undergraduates, racism (specifically, feeling threatened by racial minorities) is related to worse 
physical well-being and less social support, while both racism and sexism are related to lower 
self-esteem and higher levels of depression (Dinh, Holmberg, Ho, & Haynes, 2014). 
Social psychological research has noted that prejudice is generally either explicit or 
implicit. The study by Dinh and her colleagues (2014) focused on explicit prejudice, where 
individuals are aware of their beliefs and knowledge and generally have control over their 
prejudice-related behavior (Dambrun & Guimond, 2004; Devine, 1989). Severe explicit 
prejudice can lead to overt discrimination and hate crimes (American Psychological Association, 
2017). People also experience implicit prejudice, which is subconsciously and automatically 
 
1 Some reports place this figure as high as 12%, or one in nine Americans (GLAAD, 2017). 
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formed as a consequence of growing up in a prejudiced society (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989). 
Implicit prejudice is frequently measured in research by examining the subconscious association 
of minority groups with negative concepts (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), and is 
generally independent of explicit prejudice. Another common form of implicit prejudice is 
stereotypes: generalizations people make about those who belong to certain groups. Despite 
having explicit knowledge of stereotypes, people learn about them at such a young age that they 
automatically rely on them when learning new information and making decisions. 
Before diving into the main topics of this thesis, I need to clarify what the term stereotype 
means. Stereotypes are a type of schemata (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996), which are mental 
categories of items or concepts and the traits associated with them (such as the schema for dogs, 
which includes that they are a furry animal with four legs). Schemata are also an example of a 
heuristic (i.e., cognitive shortcut), which people frequently use when learning and interpreting 
information. The human brain does not have infinite resources: a cognitive theory contends that 
individuals have a pool of mental resources that is shared between both cognitive and perceptual 
tasks (Kahneman, 1973) and, frequently, across different sensory modalities (Wahn & König, 
2017). Heuristics like schemata allow for cognitive processes to occur much more quickly and 
efficiently, which results in effects like faster decision-making, something that is clearly 
beneficial from an evolutionary perspective. However, there are downfalls of this optimization. 
Because of this, stereotyping can interact with other cognitive processes, including 
memory. A well-established cognitive bias is that people tend to remember information about 
someone better if it fits our stereotypes (see Fyock & Stangor, 1994 for a meta-analysis), because 
they expect stereotypical information is more likely to be correct. This is called stereotype-
consistency bias (SCB). However, limited research has explored how SCB manifests for LGBT 
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individuals, with mixed and inconclusive results (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll, 1981; 
McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). Additionally, SCB is frequently 
examined from a social psychological perspective, but rarely from a cognitive standpoint, despite 
how strongly it involves memory. As such, I will consider concepts from cognitive psychology 
literature in examining this topic, especially how mental representations of individuals are 
formed in memory.  
 With the increasing visibility of the LGBT community, particularly in scripted television 
– indeed, 10.2% of “regular characters” on scripted American television in the 2019-20 season 
were LGBTQ, such as the lead character in the shows Batwoman and Pose– and other media 
(GLAAD, 2015; GLAAD, 2019), LGBT characters in media are becoming more numerous and 
prominent. This makes stories with LGBT characters an appropriate way to study prejudice 
without relying on real-world interactions. How individuals respond to LGBT characters likely 
relates to how they respond to LGBT individuals they know personally – as well as how they 
think about LGBT celebrities – as long as the stories they read are interesting, realistic, and 
relevant to their lives (Hughes & Huby, 2004). As such, I will be studying SCB for LGBT 
individuals using short stories about LGBT characters, as prior research has done (Bellezza & 
Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). The 
purpose of this thesis is to determine whether SCB occurs when remembering information about 
LGBT characters or if another cognitive bias is responsible for the findings in prior research. I 
will also propose follow-up experiments to attempt to manipulate SCB so I can better understand 
what causes it and what interventions can do to reduce it. 
In this literature review, I will first discuss situation models – which are how people 
mentally organize information they read in stories, especially information about characters – to 
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provide a background for how biases like SCB occur. I will then discuss how stereotyping relates 
to memory, particularly in the use of SCB and another cognitive bias that may cause people to 
guess stereotypical information. This will include how memory is affected by stereotypes related 
to race and sexual orientation. I will also discuss the limitations of prior SCB research, with a 
focus on methodological choices and how LGBT SCB research ignores potential gender 
differences, despite well-established gender-based SCB effects. Finally, I will summarize the 
present research of this thesis. 
The continued presence of prejudice and stereotyping against the LGBT community 
makes it important to examine LGBT stereotypes, and how stereotypes relate to memory and 
other forms of anti-LGBT prejudice. While this thesis is about understanding how and to what 
extent people use stereotypes, research in this area can hopefully be used to develop 





Human memory is largely a three-step process (Melton, 1963). When people learn new 
things or have new experiences, memories are encoded into sensory and semantic information 
first in short-term memory and later long-term memory. Once in long-term memory, those 
memories remain in storage until they are accessed again and retrieved from memory. 
Memory can falter at any of these steps: people may fail to encode unattended or 
uninteresting information, lose stored information after not accessing it for years, or fail to 
retrieve a memory of an event. This happens naturally, but some factors – varying from 
automatic cognitive shortcuts to brain damage (see Scoville and Milner, 1957 for an extreme 
example) – may affect memory more dramatically. In particular, people commonly fail to encode 
and retrieve aspects of memories that seem foreign or unusual, and instead reconstruct the 
memory using the more familiar (and easier to encode or easier to access) information (Bartlett, 
1932). I am primarily interested in how memory for information from stories may vary, which 
requires an understanding of how people keep track of that information. 
When reading stories, people construct a mental representation of characters and story 
events called a situation model (see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998 for a review). Situation models 
are the broadest way events are represented, based on more detailed surface-level information 
(i.e., the verbatim words that make up a story), the meaning of sentences within a story, and 
inferred information (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). For example, if people read the sentence 
“Karen woke up when John left the bed,” their situation models will include the exact text of the 
sentence, the meaning of the sentence (John woke Karen up), and inferred information (that 
Karen and John are in a romantic relationship) based on prior information that they have about 
why people sleep in the same bed. 
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 The kinds of information people use when creating situation models include location, 
time, cause and effect, and most importantly for this thesis, people and their actions (Zwaan, 
Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). These five facets of situation models make up the event-indexing 
model, which shows that individuals attend to all or most of these facets simultaneously while 
reading. I focus here on people portrayed as characters in stories, especially what information is 
encoded about them and included in situation models. Characters are a particularly useful aspect 
of the event-indexing model to study, as the other aspects of the model (where and when the 
characters are located, as well as the actions and decisions of the characters) are based around 
them. 
Situation models are created in a three-step process, where first an individual has a 
current model that is automatically updated while reading a story and primarily consists of what 
is currently being read (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The current model is held in working 
memory (WM), which is the part of short-term memory that keeps track of the information used 
in cognitive processing (including language-related information). Information from the current 
model is sent to long-term memory to update the integrated model, which is all the information 
from the story up to that point. After an individual has finished reading the story or section of the 
story that the situation model represents, information from the integrated model is used to 
construct a complete model. This complete model is kept in long-term memory, and it is what 
people use when recalling information about the story at a later point. People primarily add 
stereotypes to the integrated model, when other pre-existing knowledge is added and inferences 
are made (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), but they may also use stereotypes in the completed 
model on recall to either preferentially remember stereotypical information or to fill in gaps left 
by missing information. 
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People are good at keeping track of the traits of story characters. For example, previous 
research in my lab consistently found that people mentally organize permanent traits (and some 
temporary traits, such as clothes) around the characters that have them (called a person-based 
organization), such that participants respond faster when recalling information about one 
character described with three traits than three characters each described with one trait (Larson, 
2014). Another study found that 87.5% of character traits that readers remembered were accurate 
(Palena, 2017). 
Other research has explored how people track individual traits. Participants are slower to 
read sentences where characters are depicted behaving in ways that seem inconsistent with their 
traits (such as a character who has been established as a rude person going out of her way to be 
nice to a waitress; Rapp, Gerrig, & Prentice, 2001), and participants judge that the inconsistent 
behaviors would be unlikely to happen in the story. Similarly, if a character is a vegetarian, 
participants are slow to read a later sentence describing that character eating a hamburger, 
because they detect the inconsistency with their situation model (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993). 
Reading speed is commonly measured in situation model research as slower reading times 
indicate when participants are updating their mental models. People also tend to have improved 
recall for information prior to these inconsistencies, because they must “reprocess” that 
information in light of the inconsistencies. 
Limited research has focused on the process of updating character information in 
situation models (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). People may automatically incorporate 
stereotypical assumptions into situation models, because people also use schemata when 
constructing situation models and stereotypes are a type of schemata. One study found 
participants assumed a doctor character was male and a nurse character was female, and they 
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later had to update their situation models if this turned out to be incorrect (Carreiras, Garnham, 
Oakhill, & Cain, 1996); however, as this study only used texts up to three sentences in length, 
they did not examine how updating situation models may have impacted memory.  
One focus of my research is what occurs when readers incorporate assumptions (i.e., that 
all characters will be heterosexual) into their situation models, and those assumptions are later 
refuted. Similarly, I am interested in how character sexual orientation may lead participants to 





Stereotyping and Memory 
Stereotypes have been long-studied in psychological literature, even before Allport’s 
seminal report on prejudice, where he defined a stereotype as “an exaggerated belief associated 
with a category [that functions] to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category” 
(Allport, 1954, p. 191). Stereotypes exist for almost all social groups as a consequence of how 
the human mind interprets information: by relying on heuristics to simplify that information to 
categorize and understand it faster. As a result, people create schemata of what they believe the 
typical members of a group are like. This is an appropriate strategy when remembering 
information about non-human groups, such as birds – where the assumption that all birds have 
wings or flippers is harmless – but this works less well for humans. While some social group 
stereotypes can be similarly harmless (such as the stereotype that children dislike eating healthy 
foods), many stereotypes are not (such as the stereotype that African Americans are 
unintelligent). 
Stereotyping has a wide variety of negative real-world effects; perhaps the most severe in 
the United States is people of color being more likely to be convicted of a crime and serving 
longer prison sentences than white people, due to stereotypes about black and Hispanic/Latino 
males being violent and criminals (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). Stereotypes can 
also affect processes like hiring decisions (e.g., Cohen & Bunker, 1975). The use of stereotypes 
is sometimes a microaggression, which is a prejudicial or discriminatory act that seems 
insignificant on its own (Solórzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000); however, minority individuals can 
potentially experience dozens of microaggressions daily, leading to stress, exhaustion, and 
feelings of unwelcomeness (potentially to the point of a minority individual being pushed to 
leave a class, school, or job). The presence of stereotypes in a society can also cause stereotype 
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threat (Steele, 1997), where members of a stereotyped group become mentally occupied with 
worry that they will fulfill a negative stereotype about their group and end up doing worse at a 
particular task because their mental resources are being used (e.g., a woman taking an Algebra 
exam may do worse if, before the test, she is reminded of the stereotype that women are bad at 
math). 
 Because stereotypes are a cognitive construct, they can interact with other cognitive 
processes such as memory. A major finding is that people tend to remember information about 
someone better if it fits stereotypes they have about their ingroups, called stereotype-consistency 
bias. Fyock and Stangor (1994) performed a meta-analysis on SCB research showing an effect 
size of 0.34 for improved recall for “expectancy-consistent” information (although this varied 
between recall and recognition tasks). 
Some researchers argue SCB is only present under certain circumstances (e.g., Macrae, 
Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993, where participants only used SCB when their working memory 
was occupied), as counterstereotypical information should be more “surprising” and therefore 
more notable when participants have the cognitive resources to attend to it. However, SCB has 
been well-established for stereotypes about women, people of color, and the elderly, as well as 
general stereotypes not associated with prejudice, such as job- and hobby-related stereotypes. 
Perhaps the most well-researched area of SCB involved stereotypes for people of color.  
Race-Based Stereotyping and Memory 
In one study that well-represents SCB, Bigler and Liben (1993) looked at race-related 
SCB in white elementary school children. The children were read aloud several stories 
accompanied by pictures, which included either a black or white character depicted with a 
negative stereotypical trait like “lazy.” Later, they were asked which of two characters had the 
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negative stereotypical trait in a recognition task. Participants tended to be more accurate when 
recalling stereotypical stories (i.e., the black character was described with the negative 
stereotype), compared to counterstereotypical stories. Children with lower explicit racism also 
had better memory for counterstereotypical stories. SCB is likely present in young children 
because they learn stereotypes at the same time they learn other schemata, and they 
automatically use those stereotypes (Devine, 1989). While prior research has not addressed how 
members of a minority group may be affected by SCB psychologically, presumably like all 
stereotyping, SCB can act as a microaggression, causing stress and other negative side effects. 
Improved recall for stereotypical information can have important implications for 
decision-making, particularly in the judicial system. A study by Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein 
(1987) found that when undergraduates were deciding if a character accused of committing 
assault was guilty, participants who believed the character was Hispanic (based on the name 
shown at the beginning of a case file) correctly remembered significantly more evidence 
suggesting guilt than evidence suggesting innocence, while participants who thought the 
character was white recalled more innocence evidence. This is in line with racial stereotypes that 
Hispanic individuals are aggressive and criminals. Subsequently, participants were much more 
likely to decide the Hispanic character was guilty and would commit more crimes in the future. 
As people of color are particularly vulnerable in the judicial system, cognitive biases influencing 
what people remember about defendants who are people of color could significantly affect the 
outcome of criminal cases and the severity of punishments. 
Some research suggests that similar memory effects are present when individuals are 
deciding if someone is suitable for a particular job (Futoran & Wyer, 1986). Similarly, one study 
had participants read a confederate’s job application before interviewing that confederate in 
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person using a set of provided questions (Frazer & Wiersma, 2001). A week later, the 
participants completed a recall task asking about the confederate’s answers. If the confederate 
was white, participants remembered the confederate’s interview answers as being significantly 
more intelligent than if the confederate was black (reflecting the stereotype that white individuals 
are more intelligent than black individuals), despite all confederates providing the same answers. 
While less severe than similar biases in the justice system, SCB in the hiring process can have an 
impact on both hiring decisions and how new hires are treated, potentially resulting in 
microaggressions towards new employees who are remembered as being less intelligent or 
capable than they genuinely are. However, SCB does not seem to be the only memory bias that 
affects what stereotypical information people claim to recall about others. 
Alternatives to Stereotype-Consistency Bias 
One issue with SCB literature is that two separate effects frequently fall under the same 
label. In one SCB effect, participants genuinely remember stereotypical information better, as 
described above; this could be due to confirmation bias, where expected information is 
preferentially encoded, or due to easier retrieval of expectation-consistent information when 
stereotypes are activated (e.g., Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). In a different effect still called SCB, 
individuals describe characters with stereotypical information that is either false or only 
incidentally correct, because participants are guessing information that fits group stereotypes 
(e.g., Bellezza & Bower, 1981). Bellezza and Bower differentiate this from SCB, calling it 
guessing bias, a form of response bias. As such, I will use the term SCB to describe genuine 
improvements in recall. 
Another complication is the existence of research suggesting that in some situations, 
participants recall counterstereotypical information more easily because of its surprising nature 
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(an implicit process), especially when they can process that information more deeply (Macrae, 
Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). Alternatively, participants may intentionally inhibit stereotypes to 
avoid seeming prejudiced (an explicit process; Devine, 1989). However, there is less empirical 
evidence for the presence of this effect in SCB than the presence of guessing bias. 
Guessing bias. Two of the most influential SCB articles have findings which seem to 
show this second “stereotype-consistency” effect, guessing bias. While neither of them deals 
with stereotypes for minority groups, both argue that all stereotypes work similarly on a 
cognitive level. In Cantor and Mischel’s study (1977), participants read a short description of 
four characters, including an introvert and an extravert. In a recognition task, participants rated 
how confident they were that certain behaviors had been mentioned, but not which character 
performed that behavior. Participants were more confident that traits related to extraversion and 
introversion had appeared, especially for strongly related traits. This applied to both correct and 
false traits, with a similar magnitude of effect for both types of traits. This indicates that guessing 
bias is present, and higher confidence in correct extraverted traits may also be due to guessing 
bias. However, an important note is that the differences shown in this experiment might not be 
particularly meaningful. Extraverts are not a social group; extraversion is merely a personality 
trait. As such, while the authors believe traits like “energetic” are stereotypes applied to 
extraverted individuals, participants might instead view “energetic” as a synonym of 
“extraverted.” Indeed, Fyock and Stangor (1994) discuss how memory functions differently for 
information related to an individual’s character traits and that individual’s memberships in social 
groups. 
 In a different study referred to as the “priest vs. skinhead” study, Sherman and Bessenoff 
(1999) had participants read a list of behaviors that were positive (giving a stranger money), 
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negative (being loud in a movie theatre), and neutral (buying a shirt), which were ostensibly 
actions performed by a priest or a skinhead (i.e., an aggressive white supremacist); the negative 
behaviors were considered stereotypical for the skinhead. Participants also read a list of 
behaviors that were unrelated to the character. A day later, participants read another list of 
unrelated behaviors, and completed a recognition task where they were shown every previous 
behavior and had to decide which list it came from. This functioned as a source-attribution task. 
Determining that behaviors came from the second unrelated list was easy, because that list was 
read in a different context (i.e., the next day) and was more recent. This shows the importance of 
when information is learned in stereotype processing. On the other hand, in some situations 
participants were more likely to decide stereotypical behaviors from the first unrelated list had 
been used to describe the character. Because this study looked exclusively at misattributed traits 
(i.e., the proportion of answers which were incorrect), the findings demonstrate that guessing 
bias increased under cognitive load. 
Counterstereotypical information. In Sherman and Bessenoff’s “skinhead vs. priest” 
study (1999), some participants had their working memory (WM) capacity taxed by multitasking 
(i.e., being under cognitive load by keeping a large numerical value in working memory while 
performing the recognition task). Only these participants showed an increased “recall” of 
misattributed traits. This finding provides evidence for an explanation of how SCB functions: 
stereotypical information is only recalled more clearly as a heuristic, when cognitive resources 
are limited. 
Consequently, when individuals can fully utilize their cognitive resources to process 
information about a story or character, they should recall different information. Some studies 
show that participants in this situation recall information “normally” (e.g., Clark & Woll, 1981), 
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with no preference or aversion to stereotypical information. Other research shows that, when 
cognitive resources are available, individuals recall counterstereotypical information more easily 
than stereotypical information (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). This occurs because 
people tend to think more deeply about inconsistent or surprising information, as long as they 
have the resources to do so. 
However, in these cases, counterstereotypical information is also recalled more clearly 
than neutral information (Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993); participants should process 
neutral information as deeply as counterstereotypical information, suggesting another mechanism 
may be at play here. One option is a process called stereotype inhibition. After stereotypes are 
automatically activated, individuals can use cognitive resources to inhibit that stereotype and 
instead focus on nonstereotypical information (Devine, 1989). This is an intentional process that 
people engage in to stop from applying stereotypes to others or to avoid being perceived as 
prejudiced (Radvansky, Copeland, & von Hippel, 2010). 
While a lot of work has examined SCB and guessing bias for racial stereotypes, the main 
purpose of this thesis is to explore what conditions lead to SCB or guessing bias for lesbian and 
gay individuals. To do this, I will determine how much participants recall and guess stereotypical 
information about lesbian and gay characters from short stories. I focus on lesbian and gay 
stereotypes for two reasons: (1) limited research has been done on SCB for LGBT individuals, 
despite the continued prevalence of homophobia and transphobia, and (2) prior research has 
shown evidence for both SCB and guessing bias. 
Sexual Orientation-Based Stereotyping and Memory 
Here, I use LGB (lesbian, gay, bisexual) to describe characters who are not 
heterosexual/straight. While the LGBT community consists of both non-heterosexual and 
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transgender individuals, stories and media involving transgender characters are much rarer 
(GLAAD, 2015), and the average American is not particularly familiar with those stories. 
Therefore, transgender stereotyping and stories involving transgender characters, while 
important, are not discussed here. Additionally, while I use the term “heterosexual” instead of 
the term “straight” as a more formal alternative, the term “homosexual” is not used here as it as it 
has historically been used to dehumanize and pathologize LGB individuals (Drescher, 2015; 
GLAAD, 2016). The term “gay” is instead used here to encompass both gay men and lesbian 
women. I also use the term LGB to describe existing SCB research (instead of “gay” or 
“lesbian/gay”) as prior LGB SCB research does not outright state the main character’s sexual 
orientation (McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), so participants may 
believe the character is bisexual, affecting their responses. 
In 1978, Snyder and Uranowitz explored whether learning a character belonged to a 
certain group before retrieving information about them would result in SCB; they thought that 
the new information would activate stereotypes and cue related information, making it more 
accessible in memory. To test this, undergraduates read a short “case study” describing the 
events of a woman’s life. After reading the story (either immediately after reading or one week 
later), 80% of participants learned a new piece of information: 40% learned that the woman had 
a husband, while another 40% of participants learned that she had a lesbian partner; the 
remaining participants learned no new information 
One week after reading the story, participants completed a multiple-choice recognition 
test about story and character information. Answers on the test were coded as stereotypically 
lesbian, counterstereotypically lesbian (i.e., stereotypically heterosexual), neutral, or “No 
information provided,” and it varied which answer was correct. One supposed benefit to their 
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design was that certain response patterns would be consistent or inconsistent with SCB, while 
other response patterns would suggest guessing bias. If participants select more true stereotypical 
answers than true counterstereotypical answers, in addition to selecting more false stereotypical 
answers than counterstereotypical answers, this would indicate guessing bias (but would not 
negate the possibility of SCB). However, if participants select more true stereotypical answers, 
but do not select more false stereotypical answers, this would suggest SCB is present. 
Additionally, participants who believe the character is heterosexual or are not informed of her 
sexual orientation (but likely assume she is heterosexual) should not select false stereotypically 
lesbian answers, because they have no information that would suggest stereotypically lesbian 
answers are more likely to be correct.  
However, what the researchers found do not fit any of these patterns. Participants who 
believed the character was a lesbian had a higher proportion of false answers that were 
stereotypical or neutral than did participants in the heterosexual condition, but did not have a 
higher proportion of true stereotypical answers. Meanwhile, participants in the heterosexual 
condition had a higher proportion of true answers that were counterstereotypical (i.e., 
stereotypically heterosexual) or neutral answers, in addition to a higher proportion of false 
counterstereotypical answers. 
Participants who did not know the character’s sexual orientation generally had an average 
proportion of stereotypical answers (in between that of the heterosexual and lesbian conditions), 
with the exception that a slightly higher proportion of their correct answers were stereotypically 
lesbian. This suggests that specifically informing individuals of a character’s sexual orientation 
does have an effect, even though most participants will assume a character is heterosexual. 
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Additionally, the manipulation of when participants learned the character’s sexual orientation 
only minimally affected what participants recalled. 
Before moving on to other studies, I want to discuss possible explanations for those 
results. How the dependent variables were calculated may explain why the findings do not fit the 
SCB or guessing bias patterns. Because there were an uneven number of correct answers that 
were stereotypical or counterstereotypical, the dependent variables in this study were the 
proportion of correct or incorrect answers that were stereotypical. If the correct answer to a 
question was counterstereotypical, a participant selecting the stereotypical answer would be 
coded as a stereotypical error. Unfortunately, for the same question, if a participant selected the 
neutral answer, this would also be coded as a stereotypical error. In contrast, if the correct 
answer to a question was neutral, a correct answer was not coded as stereotypical. 
Alternatively, the type of question used may have influenced how participants responded. 
Using multiple-choice questions is a limitation of this study and other SCB research; if a 
participant does not know the answer to a question, seeing a stereotypical answer may prompt 
participants to believe that answer is most likely, which might not occur in an open-ended 
question. Another possibility is the fact that the researchers decided participants should learn the 
character’s sexual orientation after reading the story because of their interest in how SCB may 
occur during retrieval. In most SCB literature for other social groups, the characters’ group 
membership is known the entire time participants are reading the story (Stangor & McMillan, 
1992), either by necessity - the presence of gendered pronouns, gendered names, or race-specific 
names (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), as well as the use of picture books in 
developmental literature (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 1993) - or because in media, a character’s gender 
or race is rarely a “surprise.” Stangor and McMillan elected not to include Snyder and 
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Uranowitz’s article (1978) or similar studies in a meta-analysis due to the timing of the sexual 
orientation reveal. Unfortunately, Snyder and Uranowitz did not include a condition where 
participants learned the character’s sexual orientation before reading about her (for direct 
comparison). 
Going back to the study, the researchers also included a control condition in which 
participants learned that a story existed about a particular character, and they learned her sexual 
orientation, but they did not read the story itself; instead, they just completed the final task 
(Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). Participants who believed the character was a lesbian did not select 
more correct or incorrect stereotypical answers. Considering the other findings, this suggests that 
participants may not be intentionally selecting stereotypical answers if they do not know the 
answer to a question but, rather, the stereotype use might be an implicit (i.e., subconscious) 
process. 
These findings are difficult to interpret. They suggest that SCB (i.e., selecting more true, 
stereotypical answers) does not occur when sexual orientation is only learned after reading a 
story (i.e., when stereotypes are activated on retrieval). Guessing bias may be present here, but 
because false, neutral answers were counted as stereotypical, I cannot say for sure. The authors 
concluded that once participants are done retrieving information they know about the character, 
they can use stereotypes to reconstruct additional information that was not initially available. 
Bellezza and Bower (1981) performed a follow-up to Snyder and Uranowitz’s study 
(1977) using the same materials but updating the memory test to more accurately measure the 
presence of guessing bias. They did this because they thought that the earlier study’s results 
exclusively indicated guessing bias. In this follow-up, all participants learned of the main 
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character’s sexual orientation a week after reading the narrative and immediately before the 
redesigned memory test. 
Bellezza and Bower (1981) used a signal-detection paradigm to explore guessing bias. 
Multiple-choice questions in their memory test had answers that were coded as stereotypical, 
strongly stereotypical, counterstereotypical, or strongly counterstereotypical. Participants were 
presented with a binary choice for each question (i.e., only two of the four possible answers were 
shown). If guessing bias occurs, at times that participants rely on stereotypes to answer questions 
when they do not know the answer, participants should choose the most stereotypical answer 
because they assume that has the highest likelihood of being correct. Similarly, participants 
should choose the moderately stereotypical answer over the counterstereotypical answer. Each 
version of the story contained an equal number of stereotypes and counterstereotypes (i.e., 
heterosexual stereotypes). 
Bellezza and Bower (1981) calculated four values with signal-detection methods: the 
ease of retrieving stereotypical information (i.e., SCB), ease of retrieving counterstereotypical 
information, the response bias for selecting strong stereotypes over moderate stereotypes (i.e., 
guessing bias), and response bias for selecting moderate stereotypes over moderate 
counterstereotypes (i.e., also guessing bias). They found that SCB and recall for 
counterstereotypical information did not vary depending on the character’s sexual orientation. 
Unlike the expected pattern where participants falsely select the most stereotypical answer, 
participants had a response bias preferring moderate stereotypes that was significantly larger than 
the response bias preferring strong stereotypes. This is consistent with their finding that 
participants actually performed the best with questions where the incorrect answer was more 
stereotypical, meaning participants preferred to use more moderate stereotypes. This preference 
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could contribute to inconsistent findings in LGB SCB research. Participants also preferred to use 
lesbian stereotypes over heterosexual stereotypes, regardless of the character’s sexual 
orientation. 
 Bellezza and Bower (1981) also found stronger stereotypical guessing bias in the lesbian 
condition with the signal-detection model, and they found counterstereotypical guessing bias in 
the heterosexual condition in a second experiment. These findings suggest that learning sexual 
orientation labels after reading a story does not result in SCB but does result in guessing bias. 
The authors did not discuss the implications of participants guessing moderate lesbian 
stereotypes over stronger stereotypes, despite predicting the opposite as an aspect of guessing 
bias. One possible explanation is that, while participants still tended to rely on automatic 
stereotypes, they inhibited the strongest versions of those stereotypes. 
Clark and Woll (1981) conducted a separate follow-up to Snyder and Uranowitz’s study 
(1978) which aimed to determine (1) whether participants are more open to extrapolating 
character information using stereotypes (and are aware they are extrapolating), and (2) whether 
stereotype use varied in multiple-choice questions between surface-level (i.e., verbatim) 
information or inferred (i.e., paraphrased) information, in addition to updating their memory text 
question to have answers which are more accurately stereotypical, neutral, and 
counterstereotypical. 
Participants read either generic instructions similar to that of Snyder and Uranowitz 
(1978) or “strict” instructions for the memory test (i.e., to give the most accurate possible 
details); this was done to (hopefully) discourage participants from elaborating on story details 
(Clark & Woll, 1981). In reality, this had no effect on the results, again suggesting guessing bias 
might not be a conscious process. The researchers also found that for questions with surface-
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level answers, participants selected more stereotypical answers than they did for questions with 
inferred answers. However, this is because for questions where the correct answer was 
stereotypical, participants answered a much higher proportion of surface-level questions 
correctly (82%) than inferred questions (only 54%). Because this did not vary depending on the 
character’s sexual orientation, it suggests that surface-level questions help with the retrieval of 
lesbian stereotype information. This is an interesting finding, and potentially similar to Bellezza 
and Bower’s (1981) finding that participants preferred to use lesbian stereotypes over 
heterosexual stereotypes. As lesbian stereotypes generally overlap with masculine stereotypes, 
this may suggest a preference for masculine traits: either because masculine traits are viewed 
positively or because, after reading about a female character, participants inhibited female 
stereotypes. Clark and Woll also included multiple-choice questions where none of the answers 
were correct, and participants did not select more stereotypical answers, again suggesting against 
guessing bias. 
While Bellezza and Bower (1981) were able to replicate Snyder and Uranowitz’s (1978) 
findings showing guessing bias, Clark and Woll (1981) claimed that they failed to replicate these 
findings despite using similar materials, because none of their measures were different 
depending on the character’s sexual orientation. However, the dependent variables Clark and 
Woll used were overall stereotype use (regardless of correctness) and the proportion of selected 
answers that were correct for questions where the correct answer was stereotypical, questions 
where the correct answer was neutral, and questions where the correct answer was 
counterstereotypical. While this does indicate Clark and Woll found no evidence of SCB, Snyder 
and Uranowitz’s dependent variables showing guessing bias were the proportion of incorrect 
answers that were stereotypical or counterstereotypical. Clark and Woll did not actually look at 
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what participants selected as their incorrect answers, except for questions where all answers were 
incorrect. 
Finally, because of their supposed failed replication, Clark and Woll (1981) decided to 
more exactly replicate Snyder and Uranowitz’s (1978) methods, while also including a condition 
where participants learned the character’s sexual orientation at the beginning of the story, in line 
with other SCB research. They once again found that participants were better at answering 
questions when the correct answer was stereotypical, but this was consistent across conditions. 
The researchers found no differences between other conditions for overall stereotype use and 
proportion of correct answers, but again did not look at how stereotypical incorrect answers 
were. However, the finding that knowledge of sexual orientation during encoding does not 
increase stereotype use or SCB is unusual, as it goes against previous SCB literature and Snyder 
and Uranowitz’s finding of SCB for heterosexual stereotypes. 
To date, only one article has looked at SCB or guessing bias for gay men: a study by 
McGann and Goodwin (2007) that was also inspired by Snyder and Uranowitz’s article (1978). 
In this study, the researchers examined the potential effects of cognitive load (i.e., where 
participants’ WM was occupied), immediate vs. delayed recall, and homophobia towards gay 
men. Additionally, the design was altered so that participants learn the characters’ sexual 
orientations early in the story, instead of after reading it.  
Participants read a story that described the lives of two men who were either gay or 
straight, followed by a script-style story that depicted these two men talking to each other about 
whom they are dating (McGann & Goodwin, 2007). Participants completed multiple-choice 
memory test regarding the story immediately after participants finished reading, where all of the 
stereotypically gay answers were the wrong answer. As a result, the researchers were only 
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measuring guessing bias, and had no way to measure SCB as no stereotypical information was 
included in the story. Some participants also returned a few weeks later to retake the memory 
test. Half of the participants were under cognitive load during retrieval (i.e., when they took the 
memory test), which has been shown to increase guessing bias on recognition tasks in at least 
one other study (Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). Participants also took the gay male portion of the 
Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men Scale (ATGL-S), an explicit homophobia measure, 
but this was not correlated with stereotype use, suggesting explicit homophobia is not related to 
guessing bias.  
Participants chose more incorrect, stereotypical answers if they had read about gay 
characters (McGann & Goodwin, 2007). This difference was primarily found in the conditions 
without cognitive load, as it appears that introducing cognitive load resulted in participants in the 
straight condition choosing more stereotypical (i.e., incorrect) answers. Participants who read the 
gay narrative were not affected by cognitive load, indicating either guessing bias does not occur 
at retrieval or it uses cognitive processes other than memory. Participants also selected more 
stereotypical answers when tested after a delay, but this did not vary between conditions, 
suggesting participants were worse at remembering the correct answers to questions. The number 
of correct answers selected did not vary depending on the character’s sexual orientation, 
indicating that participants the in the gay condition were selecting stereotypical, incorrect 
answers over neutral, incorrect answers (instead of over neutral, correct answers). 
Limitations of Prior Research 
Overall, the results of these four studies are somewhat inconsistent and those results leave 
a number of unanswered questions. Guessing bias seems to consistently be found, regardless of 
when sexual orientation is learned, but no study has manipulated that while measuring guessing 
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bias to see if it is more prevalent in certain situations. SCB for heterosexual stereotypes is 
sometimes present (when sexual orientation is learned at the end of a story; Snyder & Uranowitz, 
1978), but other times no SCB is seen (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll, 1981). 
Additionally, none of these studies asked participants to self-report sexual orientation or gender 
alignment (in order to exclude LGBT participants, who may use stereotypes differently than 
heterosexual/cisgender participants) or used stories which featured two characters in a romantic 
relationship. In most other SCB literature, gender and race are consistently reinforced through 
pronouns or character names. Having the story focus on a heterosexual or gay couple has two 
effects: (1) it makes the characters’ sexual orientations more salient and important to the story, 
and (2) it should increase how much SCB is used, since prior research has established that 
having additional minority characters makes participants use SCB more (due to participants 
having to remember more information; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). 
Additionally, all LGB SCB research relies exclusively on recognition tasks. If a 
participant does not know the answer to a question, seeing a stereotypical answer may skew 
responding. Prior research has also found that SCB is stronger when participants freely recall a 
character’s behaviors than when they complete a recognition task for those behaviors (Sherman 
& Frost, 2000). As such, using both recall and recognition tasks is a good way to further explore 
this topic. Using short-answer questions as a recall task will also allow me to look at memory 
qualitatively. 
The majority of research on SCB uses stories or vignettes where characters’ group 
memberships are known from the beginning of the story. Studies with child participants 
frequently use images of the characters to make race or gender evident (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 
1993; Signorella & Liben, 1984), while adult research may immediately use the characters’ 
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names and pronouns (e.g., Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987) or directly state their race. This 
reflects real-world interactions and stories: gender and race are almost always immediately 
visible and recognizable. However, being a member of the LGBT community is not necessarily 
visible. Perhaps because of this, SCB research about LGBT characters has primarily revealed 
character sexual orientation after participants have finished reading (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; 
Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). 
Another concern with previous LGB SCB research is that in some studies participants 
were frequently instructed “to form a complete impression of the” main character (Snyder & 
Uranowitz, 1978, p. 943), and they were told they would be answering questions about what they 
read. However, instructions like these do not reflect real-world interactions with LGBT 
individuals; people are rarely told to get a “complete impression” of a real person, and are rarely 
quizzed on what they know about someone. To a similar effect, specifically instructing 
participants to avoid focusing on stereotypical information has the opposite effect (Sherman, 
Stroessner, Loftus, & Deguzman, 1997). While reading comprehension tests after reading stories 
are common in an academic setting, I am more interested in how participants respond to stories 
they read in a naturalistic setting. Telling participants they will be tested on their memory 
performance may cause them to pay more attention to character information than they would 
naturally. As such, in my experiment participants were not told that they would be completing a 
memory test; they were only told to read the story like they would normally read a novel. 
Another potentially useful measure is confidence ratings (i.e., how confident participants 
are that their selected answer is correct). While some prior LGB SCB research has measured 
them (Bellezza & Bower, 1981), they have not been used in any analyses. Confidence ratings are 
not always directly useful, as individuals can be very confident that incorrect answers and false 
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memories are correct (Roediger & DeSoto, 2014). However, confidence ratings could relate to 
guessing bias use and help indicate when participants selecting a correct stereotypical answer are 
guessing. Further, some SCB research uses confidence ratings on a recognition task (i.e., “How 
confident are you that the character was described as having this trait?”) in lieu of multiple-
choice or forced-choice questions (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977).  
While explicit homophobia was not related to guessing bias (McGann & Goodwin, 
2007), it may be related to SCB (as prior research has shown explicit racism is related to race-
based SCB; Bigler & Liben, 1993), and implicit homophobia may be related to either bias. In a 
1986 study examining memory for gay male characters in an audio recording, Walker and Antaki 
report that more explicitly homophobic men, when remembering who said a particular statement 
in an audio recording, make mistakes in which gay man said a statement, and they made 
mistakes in which straight man said a statement. Homophobic men tended not to make mistakes 
for whom the speaker was between sexual orientations. This pattern of responses was not found 
in less homophobic individuals. The researchers suggest this is because more homophobic 
individuals are categorizing others on the basis of their sexual orientation, affecting memory, so 
explicit homophobia may also affect SCB. 
Another variable to consider is working memory. Stereotype use increases when WM is 
otherwise occupied during encoding (e.g., Macrae et al., 1993, where SCB increased in both 
recall and recognition tasks). This is because people rely on heuristics like stereotypes to 
interpret incoming information when they have limited ability to process that information, which 
indicates that knowing sexual orientation during encoding may increase SCB. When WM is 
occupied during retrieval, it seems to increase guessing bias in some situations (Sherman & 
Bessenoff, 1999) but not others (McGann & Goodwin, 2007), suggesting guessing bias may 
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occur during both encoding and retrieval. Some research has also shown that individuals with 
low WM capacity show more guessing bias and less SCB (Knuycky, 2013, as cited in Gruszka-
Gosiewska & Nęcka, 2017).  
A final variable that prior LGB SCB research has not considered is gender. Guessing bias 
seems to be consistently present for both lesbian and gay male characters, but no research has 
compared responses to those groups directly to determine if there are differences. Further, no 
study to date has measured SCB for gay male characters. Gender is an important variable to 
consider in LGB SCB research for two reasons: homophobia varies depending on the 
participant’s and target’s genders, and gender significantly impacts what individuals remember 
about characters in stories. 
Gender-Based Stereotyping and Memory 
Bonds-Raacke and her colleagues (2007) instructed participants to remember and 
describe an LGB character who had a positive or negative portrayal in popular media. 
Remembering a positively portrayed LGB character resulted in significantly higher ATGL-S 
scores, particularly for attitudes towards gay men. This suggests that attitudes towards gay men 
are more variable than attitudes towards lesbians (and that the presence of LGB characters can 
affect self-reported explicit homophobia). On both the Homophobia Scale and the Modern 
Homophobia Scale, other explicit homophobia measures, undergraduate men reported much 
more negative attitudes towards gay men than women did (Aosved & Long, 2007; Wright, 
Adams, & Bernat, 1999). However, men and women expressed similarly negative attitudes 
towards lesbians. Despite this gender disparity, homophobia towards gay men was highly 
correlated with homophobia towards lesbians. Another study also examining undergraduates 
found that men are more explicitly homophobic in general (Dinh et al., 2014). Men in the general 
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population also exhibit more implicit homophobia, showing a stronger preference for 
heterosexual individuals than women do (Nosek et al., 2007). Specifically regarding characters 
in stories, women reading about a character whose significant other breaks up with them feel 
more reactive empathy towards straight characters than towards gay characters, with especially 
low empathy when that character is a gay male (Groth et al., 2012). As such, character gender 
and participant gender are both important independent variables to examine. 
Another reason to consider gender in LGB SCB research is the existence of gender-based 
SCB. A meta-analysis by Signorella, Bigler, and Liben (1997) found that in children and 
adolescents, girls consistently recalled information about female characters more accurately, 
while boys recalled information about male characters better. SCB was present at similar levels 
regardless of age (with a range from elementary school children to undergraduates) or the length 
of time between learning information and being tested on it, which is in line with LGB SCB 
research showing minimal differences with delayed recall (Goodwin & McGann, 2007; Snyder 
& Uranowitz, 1978). More broadly, Signorella and her colleagues also found that girls 
remembered feminine character information better; they found the same trend for boys with 
masculine information. Gendered story content would consist of things like characters 
performing stereotypically gendered behaviors (e.g., sewing, directing traffic) or holding 
stereotypically gendered jobs (e.g., firefighter, nurse). This effect was shown even when a male 
character had the feminine behavior or job, and vice versa (Liben & Signorella, 1993). 
These findings have interesting implications for LGB SCB research. If men remember 
information about male characters better, they should use guessing bias less. However, if men 
fail to remember feminine information about male characters, they may use guessing bias more, 
especially if increased homophobia towards gay men results in increased stereotyping. 
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Additionally, men recalling masculine information about female characters better than feminine 
information may be a partial cause of SCB. (The same series of effects apply to women.) On the 
other hand, these conflicting possibilities may also be responsible for attenuating SCB for LGB 
characters; if men recall masculine information about a female character better (and the same for 
women with feminine information), regardless of that character’s sexual orientation, between-
subjects analyses would show that SCB is not present. Another possibility is that people only 
have improved recall for same-gendered character information when that character is 
heterosexual, perhaps due to decreased empathy for non-heterosexual characters (e.g., Groth et 
al., 2012). Additionally, gender-based SCB research generally does not consider how masculine 
or feminine individual participants may be, or whether any of those participants are gender-
nonconforming, which may also affect results. 
My tentative hypothesis is that women will still stereotype lesbian characters the most, 
and the same for men with gay male characters, due to a combination of increased homophobia, 
worse memory for unrelatable characters (Hughes & Huby, 2007), and lack of empathy. 
However, I am unable to predict the exact avenue that stereotyping takes, so analyses examining 
gender differences in guessing bias and SCB will be exploratory. Gender differences in 
stereotyping are the final concern I have about previous LGB SCB research, so based on that 




The Current Research 
The primary goal of my research was to determine under what circumstances SCB and 
guessing bias are used when recalling information about lesbian and gay characters. To do this, I 
attempted to replicate prior research showing guessing bias for information about lesbian and 
gay characters, while also updating the method to be more like other SCB literature (to hopefully 
induce SCB) while including measures more typical of situation model research. I considered 
how gender, homophobia, and related variables may affect stereotype use. I also proposed future 
research to specifically manipulate when the main character’s sexual orientation is learned, to see 
if that is what decreases SCB and increases guessing bias.  
As such, my general hypotheses for this thesis were: 
(1) Participants will recall stereotypically gay information about characters more 
accurately when those characters are gay. Similarly, participants will recall stereotypically 
heterosexual information about heterosexual characters more accurately. 
This hypothesis is based on prior LGB SCB research that showed heterosexual SCB 
(Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978) and how consistently SCB is shown for other minority groups when 
certain methodological choices are used (Bigler & Liben, 1993; Fyock & Stangor, 1994; 
Signorella et al., 1997) 
(2) Participants will guess stereotypically gay information about gay characters 
when they are missing information about those characters. Similarly, participants will 
guess stereotypically heterosexual information about heterosexual characters when they 
are missing information. 
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Guessing bias for LGB characters has been well-established in existing LGB SCB 
research (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), so 
the purpose of this hypothesis is to replicate that research. 
(3) Methodological choices in prior lesbian/gay stereotyping literature is responsible 
for the presence of guessing bias and the lack of stereotype-consistency bias; otherwise, 
sexual orientation-based stereotype-consistency bias works similar to race- and gender-
based stereotype-consistency bias. 
The methodological differences between LGB SCB research (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; 
Clark & Woll, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978) and other SCB 
literature (Bigler & Liben, 1993; Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Signorella et al., 1997) are a 
reasonable explanation for the varying findings. In particular, knowing the sexual orientation of 
the main characters during encoding should result in SCB, as prior research has established SCB 
partially occurs during encoding (Macrae et al., 1993). 
(4) Gender of the participants and characters will affect stereotype use, with men 
stereotyping gay male characters the most and women stereotyping lesbian characters the 
most. 
This hypothesis comes from gender differences in explicit homophobia (Aosved & Long, 
2007; Dinh et al., 2014; Wright et al., 1999), implicit homophobia (Nosek et al., 2007), and 





 The primary goal of this experiment was replicating prior research showing stereotyping 
for lesbian and gay characters, while changing certain aspects of the stereotype-inducing 
materials to better reflect other SCB research and real-world experiences with LGBT individuals, 
in addition to including extra measures that may be relevant to stereotype use. 
 Specifically, participants read a traditional short story (with both exposition and dialogue) 
featuring heterosexual or gay characters in a romantic relationship described with validated 
stereotypical and counterstereotypical attributes, to hopefully bolster SCB effects. Sexual 
orientation of the main character was revealed partway through the story, when the main 
character’s romantic partner was introduced, to represent real-world experiences with LGB 
individuals (e.g., where people may assume a female friend is heterosexual until she mentions 
her wife). I am also directly comparing stereotyping for lesbian and gay characters, and 
measuring additional variables: sentence reading times, social desirability, explicit homophobia, 
implicit homophobia, and whether individuals personally know LGBT individuals. This study 
was approved by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas’ Institutional Review Board. 
Hypotheses 
(1) Participants will stereotype the characters more when the characters are gay 
(compared to when they are heterosexual). 
Based on prior LGB SCB research showing some kind of stereotyping (Bellezza & 
Bower, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), and the continued use of 
stereotypes towards LGBT individuals in the United States (Callender, 2015). 
(2) With the updated methods in this study, participants will show stereotype-
consistency bias after reading about gay characters. 
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The extensive research showing SCB when minority status is known during encoding 
(see Fyock & Stangor, 1994 for a meta-analysis) and other methodological choices are used 
suggests LGB SCB can be induced with those methods. 
(3) Participants will show some guessing bias after reading about gay characters. 
This hypothesis comes from previous LGB SCB research which consistently shows 
guessing bias (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 
1978). 
(4) Female participants will stereotype lesbian characters the most, while male 
participants will stereotype gay male characters the most.  
Women are more prejudiced towards lesbians, while men are more prejudiced towards 
gay men (Aosved & Long, 2007; Dinh et al., 2014; Nosek et al., 2007; Wright et al., 1999), 
which forms the basis for this hypothesis. 
(5) Participants will read the critical sentence revealing the main character’s sexual 
orientation more slowly when the character is gay (compared to when the character is 
heterosexual). 
This is because a character being gay is a surprise to the reader and inconsistent with the 
situation model the reader has created; slower reading times reflect participants having to update 
that situation model (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Rapp et al., 2001). 
(6) Stereotype use can be predicted from explicit homophobia, implicit homophobia, 
reading comprehension, and personally knowing LGBT individuals.  
Previous research has shown that explicit racism is linked to racial SCB (Bigler & Liben, 
1993), stereotyping is a form of prejudice that happens automatically (Devine, 1989; so it should 
be linked to implicit prejudice), participants are less accurate when they have more (unrelated) 
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information to remember (Larson, 2014; Stangor & McMillan, 1992), and personally knowing 
members of a minority group should reduce prejudice towards them (Allport, 1954). Therefore, I 
should be able to predict SCB and guessing bias from these factors. 
Participants 
In Snyder and Uranowitz’s study (1978), the effect size of the difference between 
stereotyping scores for the heterosexual condition and the lesbian condition was 0.282. 
According to G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), for a power of 0.80 (as 
recommended by Cohen, 1988) for a between-subjects 2 (character sexual orientation) x 2 
(character gender) x 2 (participant gender) analysis of variance (ANOVA), a minimum sample 
size of 101 participants would be required. 
A total of 135 participants were recruited from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Department of Psychology subject pool, where undergraduates participate in research for course 
credit. Three participants requested that their data be excluded from analyses. Of the remaining 
sample, 26 individuals identified as belonging to the LGBT community, and 3 participants did 
not disclose their sexual orientation, so they were excluded from all analyses. The majority of 
analyses in this study were performed on the remaining 103 participants who identified as both 
cisgender and heterosexual (or “fluid heterosexual”); I refer to this group as the heterosexual 
sample. 
The heterosexual sample was 65% female (67 women) and racially diverse: 27.2% Asian 
or Middle Eastern, 26.2% Hispanic or Latino, 24.3% non-Hispanic white, 10.7% black, 6.8% 
Native American or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and 4.9% mixed race.  
The mean age of the heterosexual sample was 19.81 years (SD = 2.56), and the sample 
was primarily freshman (51.5%) or sophomores (24.3%). Most of the sample selected 
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“moderate” as their political views (50.5%), and the sample otherwise skewed left politically 
(34% “liberal or left-wing” to 14.6% “conservative or right-wing”). Participants were about 
evenly split between “religious,” “somewhat religious,” and “not religious.” Of religious 
participants, the largest group identified as Catholic (34%). Most participants (79.6%) were 
Native English speakers. 
The demographics of the LGBT sample were similar: 72.4% women, 24.1% men, and 1 
non-binary participant, with a racially diverse sample (including 27.6% Hispanic or Latino and 
24.1% non-Hispanic white) and a mean age of 19.07 (SD = 1.03). However, most of the sample 
selected “liberal or left-wing” political views (58.6%), while the remaining 41.4% selected 
“moderate.” Only 7.7% of participants indicated they were “religious,” and the remainder were 
split between “somewhat religious” and “not religious.” 
Materials 
Story. A 3,500-word short story was written for this study, and there were four different 
versions. In each version of the story, the main character’s gender (male or female) and sexual 
orientation (heterosexual or gay) varied. Sexual orientation was manipulated by changing the 
gender of the character’s romantic partner. Thus, there were two heterosexual (male character 
with female partner; female character with male partner) and two gay (male character with male 
partner; female character with female partner) conditions. Gender was manipulated by changing 
the characters’ first names and pronouns; first names were selected from the top five most 
popular baby names from the years the characters would have been born. The main character’s 
name was either Michael or Sarah, and the romantic partner’s name was either Ashley or 
Andrew. The story was fairly generic (i.e., the main character deals with a new employee at work 
before unexpectedly learning that their romantic partner is planning on moving across the 
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country for a job), and features a couple going through some conflict in their relationship and 
interacting with their friends (one version of the full story is listed in Appendix A). The story 
was written in this way because Hughes and Huby (2007) suggested that appropriately-written 
stories and vignettes (i.e., where the content is interesting, realistic, and relevant to the 
participants) are a suitable method for studying how people react to real-world individuals. 
Finally, the story was edited by multiple non-heterosexual and non-white individuals to obtain a 
variety of perspectives, ensuring the story accurately reflected both heterosexual and gay 
experiences and was relatable to a variety of participants. 
For the purposes of this experiment, the main character was ascribed a number of 
stereotypical, neutral, and counterstereotypical attributes. The stereotypes chosen were based on 
ratings from six heterosexual undergraduates on how commonly certain characteristics are 
applied to heterosexual, gay, and bisexual men and women (see Appendix B). Prior LGB SCB 
research tended to assume that, for example, all gay male stereotypes are heterosexual male 
counterstereotypes. However, this is not always the case; for example, the raters indicated that 
“flirtatious” (a trait considered a gay male stereotype by McGann & Goodwin, 2007) is a 
stereotype of gay men and heterosexual men (as well as a stereotype for lesbians, heterosexual 
women, bisexual men, and bisexual women; meaning “flirtatious” for some individuals will be a 
stereotypical trait regardless of character gender or sexual orientation). As such, I selected traits 
that are stereotypical for gay individuals (of a certain gender) – if at least half of the raters agreed 
– but not stereotypical for heterosexual individuals (of that same gender). Additionally, as I 
manipulated character gender, I wanted to reduce the potential confound of using different 
stereotypes for different story versions. Thus, the traits I included in the story are either: 
stereotypical for gay men and heterosexual women, while not stereotypical for heterosexual men 
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and lesbians (called feminine stereotypes); or stereotypical for heterosexual men and lesbians, 
while not stereotypical for gay men or heterosexual women (called masculine stereotypes). The 
full list of selected stereotypes can be found in Appendix B. 
Memory test. A memory test was created that was administered after participants read 
the short story (see Appendix C). This test measured general reading comprehension (accuracy 
scores) as well as how much participants stereotype the characters. In order to minimize bias or 
influence on participants, the memory test started with short-answer open-ended items (i.e., a 
recall task) such as “Describe how this character looked.” How participants describe appearance 
and behaviors may reveal additional information about their views of the characters, especially 
with short-answer (vs. fill-in-the-blank) questions. Open-ended questions were answered first on 
a separate page to avoid the possibility that seeing stereotypical answers induces guessing bias. 
The open-ended questions were followed by multiple-choice questions (i.e., a recognition task), 
where answers were categorized as stereotypical, counterstereotypical, or neutral. Which 
category of answer is the correct answer varied. For some questions, the correct answer was 
“This information was not provided.” There were also some questions unrelated to stereotypes, 
where all answers were neutral, which were used as reading comprehension questions.  
Social desirability. Participants completed the 15-item short form of the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 6 Scale (Bobbio & Manganelli, 2001), which 
measures social desirability and has a reliability of α = 0.71 for undergraduates (see Appendix 
D). This measure was modified to have the same scale as the previous measures. An example 
item is, “I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.” 
Homophobia measures. Participants completed three pre-existing explicit homophobia 
measures. The first was the Homophobia Scale (Wright et al., 1999; see Appendix E), a 25-item 
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survey, selected because it measures modern, subtle examples of explicit homophobia. The 
Homophobia Scale has a high reliability of α = 0.94 (Fisher, Davis, Yarber, & Davis, 2010). 
Participants in 1999 scored an average of 32.04, with men scoring higher. An example item is “If 
I discovered a friend was gay I would end the friendship,” and participants select how much they 
agree with that statement on a Likert scale which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The Homophobia Scale originally ranged from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly 
disagree), but I modified that here so all measures would have consistent scales. The 
Homophobia Scale has three subscales: negative affect/behavior, aggressive affect/behavior, and 
negative cognition. 
The second measure was the 10-item Revised Short Version #1 of the Attitudes Towards 
Lesbians and Gay Men Scale, or ATGL-S, which uses the same Likert scale as the previous 
measure (Herek, 1997; see Appendix F). This scale measures homophobia specifically towards 
gay men and lesbians, and was selected because of its use in prior relevant research (McGann & 
Goodwin, 2007; Bonds-Raacke et al., 2007). While this scale is similar to the Homophobia 
Scale, participants may be more prejudiced towards gay men or lesbians (Aosved & Long, 
2006), which may affect participants’ memory for stereotypes depending on the character 
gender. Reliability of the ATLG-S varies, but for undergraduates generally α < 0.85. The male 
and female subscales (each five items) are phrased identically, so homophobia towards men and 
women is directly comparable. An example item is “Sex between two women is just plain 
wrong.” 
Questions on the Homophobia Scale and ATLG-S were mixed together and randomized 
on an individual basis, to avoid any ordering effects or a response bias where participants select 
the same answers on both subscales of the ATLG-S. (The only known negative consequence of 
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randomizing questionnaire items is that it may decrease reliability of the measures slightly, but 
this is possibly due to a falsely inflated reliability when items are not randomized; see Goodhue 
& Loiacono, 2002.) 
Participants also completed a third homophobia measure, the Implicit Association Task 
(IAT), which examines implicit homophobia (Greenwald et al., 1998). The words used in my 
version of the IAT came from the Project Implicit Homophobia IAT, where participants sorted 
words as “good” or “bad,” and as relating to “straight” or “gay” individuals (Nosek et al., 2007). 
The original Project Implicit IAT also includes cartoons of various couples, but I removed these 
so the stimuli would be more consistent (i.e., all words, like the other measures used in this 
study). 
In this task, participants press keys on a computer keyboard to sort words to either the left 
or right side of the screen depending on their category. The theory behind the IAT is that 
individuals implicitly (i.e., subconsciously) associate outgroups and societally underprivileged 
groups with negative concepts, while associating ingroups or societally privileged groups with 
positive concepts. As such, participants tend to be slightly faster sorting “straight” items and 
“good” items to the same side of the screen (i.e., when they are spatially linked) than they are 
sorting “gay” items and “good” items to the same side.  
The average reliability of the IAT is α = 0.79 (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, 
& Schmitt, 2005). In the Project Implicit Homophobia IAT, 68% of participants exhibited a 
subconscious preference for heterosexual individuals, and a preference existed regardless of 
gender, race, age, or political leaning. 
In my version of the IAT, after completing a number of training phases, participants 
completed a compatible phase (sorting “straight” items with “good” items and “gay” items with 
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“bad” items) and an incompatible phase (sorting “straight” items with “bad” items, etc.; see 
Appendix G for a list of items). Response times are measured during these phases, and slower 
average responding during the incompatible phase indicates an implicit preference for the 
associations in the compatible phase. My IAT was administered on the website Qualtrics using 
the software iatgen, which uses JavaScript to present the IAT (Carpenter et al., 2018). Iatgen 
automatically creates counterbalanced versions of the IAT, manipulating whether the compatible 
or incompatible phase happens first (to avoid order effects, as the second phase is the reverse of 
what participants trained on, so they tend to be slightly slower) and manipulating whether “gay” 
characteristics are sorted to the left or right side of the screen (to avoid spatial effects). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of these four counterbalanced conditions. 
Demographics and other measures.  
This study also included an 11-item demographics survey (see Appendix I) where 
participants were asked to describe their sexual orientation, which prior research has not 
assessed. Finally, I also developed a six-item survey to assess whether participants personally 
know any LGBT individuals (see Appendix H). Participants were instructed to select how much 
they agree with items using a scale of 1 (disagree) to 3 (agree) (essentially a “no,” “maybe/I 
don’t know,” “yes” scale). An example item is “I am friends with someone who is lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, etc.” 
Procedure 
The study was administered on computers in a lab setting, using the software E-Prime 
and the survey website Qualtrics. Anywhere from one to four participants were in the same room 
while completing the study, but they were in separate cubicles and unable to see other 
participants’ screens.  
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After reading the informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of 
the four story versions using block randomization, to ensure an equal number of participants read 
each version. Instead of being told to form an impression of the main character so they could 
answer questions about them later (as in Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), participants were told to 
read the story like they would read a typical novel, and were not informed they would be 
completing a memory test. 
The short story was presented sentence by sentence to measure reading times, and 
participants manually advanced to the next sentence. This was followed by the BIDR short form 
scale, which also acted as a distractor task so participants stop attending to information about the 
story. Participants then completed the open-ended and multiple-choice sections of the memory 
test.  
Following the memory test, participants were randomly assigned by Qualtrics software to 
complete one of the four versions of the homophobia IAT, before completing both explicit 
homophobia measures (which also had the questions in an order randomized by Qualtrics). 
Finally, participants answered if they personally know any LGBT individuals before completing 
the demographics questionnaire and being debriefed on the purpose of the study. 
Results 
Because my sample contained an unexpectedly large percentage of LGBT participants 
(19.7%, over double the expected 7.3%), I was able to conduct some analyses on how responses 
and recall vary between LGBT participants and the heterosexual sample. However, as I am 
primarily interested in the stereotype use of non-LGBT individuals, for the majority of analyses, 
all LGBT participants were excluded from analyses (as done in Walker & Antaki, 1986), as they 
would possibly show less (or different) stereotype use than heterosexual, cisgender participants.  
43 
 
Quantitative data. As a reminder, for multiple-choice (i.e., recognition) questions, there 
was an equal number of questions where the correct answer is stereotypical, counterstereotypical, 
neutral, or “This information was not provided.” There were also an equal number of feminine 
and masculine traits applied to both the main character and that character’s romantic partner, 
regardless of condition. For the gay male condition, I calculated stereotypical accuracy (the 
number of correct, stereotypical answers selected) by tabulating the number of feminine traits 
used to describe both main characters. In the lesbian condition, the same applied with masculine 
traits. 
However, this was more complicated for the heterosexual conditions, where feminine 
traits are stereotypical for one character, and masculine traits are stereotypical for the other. To 
directly compare the gay and heterosexual conditions, I split stereotypical accuracy scores by 
character. Thus, while prior LGB SCB research has used dependent measures like the proportion 
of correct answers that were stereotypical (e.g., Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), I calculated: 
1. Feminine accuracy (main character): the number of correct, feminine answers selected 
about the main character. In the conditions where the main character is a gay male or a 
heterosexual female, this is stereotypical accuracy, and somewhat represents SCB for those two 
conditions. In the other two conditions, this is counterstereotypical accuracy. 
2. Masculine accuracy (main character): the number of correct, masculine answers 
selected about the main character. In the conditions where the main character is a heterosexual 
male or lesbian female, this is stereotypical accuracy, and somewhat represents SCB. 
3. Feminine inaccuracy (main character): the number of incorrect, feminine answers 
selected about the main character. In the gay male and heterosexual female conditions, this is 
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stereotypical inaccuracy, and represents guessing bias. In the other two conditions, this is 
counterstereotypical inaccuracy. 
4. Masculine inaccuracy (main character): the number of incorrect, masculine answers 
selected about the main character. In the heterosexual male and gay female conditions, this is 
stereotypical inaccuracy, and represents guessing bias. 
5-8. The above variables calculated for questions about the romantic partner character. 
9. Neutral accuracy: the number of correct, neutral answers. This should be 
approximately equal to the sum of “main character” and “romantic partner” counterstereotypical 
accuracy, unless participants fail to encode counterstereotypical information. 
10. Neutral inaccuracy: the number of incorrect, neutral answers. This should also be 
approximately equal to summed counterstereotypical inaccuracy, unless participants avoid 
counterstereotypical answers when they do not know the answer to a question.  
11. Reading comprehension: the number of correct answers for questions where all 
answers are neutral, which should not vary depending on condition, but may be related to 
stereotype use or guessing bias (where participants who fail to remember general story 
information also forget character information and guess stereotypes). 
Splitting the data between questions about the main character and their romantic partner 
also allowed me to check for any differences between responses to the two characters. 
Data normalization. To examine whether, for example, participants showed more 
feminine accuracy than neutral accuracy for the main character in certain conditions, I needed to 
directly compare those scores. While all of the questions I used to calculate these variables are 
multiple-choice, each variable did not contain the same number of questions: the reading 
comprehension score contained 2.5 times as many questions as feminine and masculine 
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accuracy, while one of the questions used to determine neutral accuracy was unfortunately not 
included in the memory test. This means the scores had different ranges. 
Because questions where the stereotypical answer is correct are not more difficult than 
other questions, I normalized the scores to make them directly comparable. As the accuracy 
scores are a ratio scale variable, I normalized them by representing participants’ scores with a 
vector as if it existed in multidimensional space, with the number of “dimensions” being the 
number of scores (Abdi, 2010). First, I calculated the magnitude of the vector representing all of 
the feminine accuracy scores (also known as the norm). If 𝑋1 represented one participant’s 
stereotypical accuracy score, ‖𝑋‖ represented the magnitude, and 𝑁 represented the number of 
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This process transformed each score into a positive value between 0 and 1, with the 
magnitude being 1. I then repeated the process with the other accuracy scores for both characters, 
as well as the reading comprehension scores. 
Preliminary analyses. Before analyzing my data, I needed to conduct a set of 
preliminary analyses to confirm there are no statistically significant differences between the four 
randomized groups.  
There was no statistically significant effects for reading comprehension scores on the 
basis of the participant’s gender (F(1,95) = 0.764, p = 0.384), the main character’s gender 
(F(1,95) = 0.734, p = 0.394), the main character’s sexual orientation, (F(1,95) = 1.066, p = 
0.305), or the interactions between the three (participant gender by character gender: F(1,95) = 
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0.019, p = 0.892; participant gender by sexual orientation: F(1,95) = 0.724, p = 0.397; character 
gender by sexual orientation: F(1,95) = 2.299, p = 0.133; three-way interaction: F(1,95) = 0.043, 
p = 0.837). The lack of differences may be due to a ceiling effect, with the mean number of 
incorrect answers being only 1.35. Overall, reading comprehension was fairly good with 
participants scoring far above chance: all participants selected the correct answer for at least 50% 
of reading comprehension questions. Similarly, social desirability scores did not significantly 
vary across participant gender (F(1,95) = 0.090, p = 0.765), character gender (F(1,95) = 0.064, p 
= 0.801), character sexual orientation (F(1,95) = 0.816, p = 0.369), or the interactions between 
the three (participant gender by character gender: F(1,95) = 0.066, p = 0.797; participant gender 
by sexual orientation: F(1,95) = 0.844, p = 0.361; character gender by sexual orientation: F(1,95) 
= 1.006, p = 0.318; three-way interaction: F(1,95) = 0.017, p = 0.897.) Social desirability scores 
were also significantly lower here (M = 2.99, SD = 0.464) than in the original sample of students 
(M = 3.51, SD ≈ 0.57 to 0.69), t(102) = 11.171, p < 0.00001. 
For preliminary analyses on the following measures, I expected gender differences based 
on prior research showing men are generally more homophobic.  
For the Homophobia Scale, the mean score was 37.85 (SD = 13.612), which was 
significantly higher than the mean of 32.04 reported by the creators of the scale (Wright et al., 
1999), t(102) = 4.336, p < 0.001. As in that study, men (M = 43.78, SD = 14.9) showed 
significantly higher explicit homophobia scores than women (M = 34.70, SD = 11.8), t(101) = 
3.366, p < 0.002, d = 0.67. Explicit homophobia scores did not significantly vary between gender 
 
2 Following van Selst and Jolicoeur’s (1994) suggestion that for a sample this large, values 2.5 standard deviations 
away from the mean are outliers, any Homophobia Scale scores 72 and above would be outliers. However, this 
would have included about 5% of participants, and their scores were still reasonably within the range of possible 
scores (25 to 125), so I elected to keep these scores in the analyses. 
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conditions (F(1,95) = 0.978, p = 0.325) or sexual orientation conditions (F(1,95) = 1.651, p = 
0.202).  
For gendered explicit homophobia scores, I used the ATGL-S, which allowed me to 
directly compare homophobia against gay men and homophobia against lesbians. As predicted, 
participants had higher homophobia scores towards gay men (M = 9.61, SD = 4.3) than towards 
lesbians (M = 9.12, SD = 3.65), t(100) = 2.209, p < 0.03, d = 0.22. However, neither homophobia 
score significantly varied by participant gender (gay male homophobia: F(1,93)3 = 0.0, p = 
0.986; lesbian homophobia: F(1,94)4 = 2.137, p = 0.147), character gender (gay male 
homophobia: F(1,93) = 0.205, p = 0.652; lesbian homophobia: F(1,94) = 1.458, p = 0.230), or 
character sexual orientation (gay male homophobia: F(1,93) = 1.073, p = 0.303), with one 
exception: participants who read about gay characters (M = 8.49, SD = 2.94) showed marginally 
significantly lower scores for homophobia towards lesbians, compared to participants who read 
about heterosexual characters (M = 9.84, SD = 3.66), F(1,100) = 3.57, p = 0.062, ηp
2 = 0.034. 
This effect was primarily driven by participants who read about female characters. Intriguingly, 
this effect remained when controlling for social desirability scores (F = 3.204), suggesting that 
reading about gay characters - especially lesbians - made readers exhibit genuinely lower explicit 
homophobia. However, this effect may instead be driven by the somewhat higher lesbian 
homophobia scores in those who read about a heterosexual woman (M = 10.64, SD = 4.05), 
compared to those who read about a heterosexual man (M = 9.08, SD = 4.24), although this 
difference did not reach significance: t(49) = 1.345, p = 0.184, d = 0.38. I suspect participants 
 
3
 Two participants did not complete >10% questions on the gay male subscale of the ATGL-S. 
4
 One participant did not complete >10% questions on the lesbian subscale of the ATGL-S. 
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who were randomly assigned to the “heterosexual female character” condition happened to have 
higher explicit homophobia scores towards lesbians. 
IAT scores were comprised of d scores (showing the difference between response times 
in the incompatible phase of the IAT and the compatible phase) that were automatically 
calculated by iatgen software (Carpenter et al., 2018). The software automatically removed 
outliers and corrected for error trials according to Lane, Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald’s 
procedure (2007); one participant was removed for completing IAT trials too quickly. 
There was a difference in IAT scores between male and female participants that 
approached significance, t(100) = -1.901, p = 0.060, d = 0.38. As expected from previous 
research (Nosek et al., 2007), there was a pattern where men (M = -0.52, SD = 0.39) had a larger 
difference between their reaction times for the compatible vs. incompatible phases than women 
did (M = -0.37, SD = 0.39); this indicates men showed more implicit prejudice, but, as noted 
previously, this was not significant. However, IAT scores did vary between conditions, with a 
statistically significant interaction between character gender and character sexual orientation, 
F(1,94) = 5.231, p < 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.053. I suggested that reading about a gay character may make 
participants subconsciously more accepting of gay individuals, which was partially correct: 
participants who read about a gay male character (M = -0.30, SD = 0.40) had smaller IAT scores 
than those who read about a heterosexual man (M = -0.56, SD = 0.43), t(50) = 2.313, p = 0.025. 
Meanwhile, IAT scores for participants who read about a lesbian character (M = -0.46, SD = 
0.31) were not statistically different than for those who read about the heterosexual female 
character (M = -0.36, SD = 0.41), t(48) = 1.008, p = 0.32. These findings suggest that reading 
about a gay man may have decreased participants’ implicit homophobia, at least temporarily.  
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Memory test item analysis. Because the memory test questions were newly created for 
this study, this section describes a simple breakdown of these questions. There were three (out of 
ten) reading comprehension questions where 100% of participants selected the correct answer 
(or, rarely, selected “this information was not provided”). Reading comprehension questions are 
not theoretically meaningful, so this ceiling effect is unimportant. The same applied to one 
stereotype-related question (“What is the main character’s hobby?”), but the remaining 15 
memory test questions showed variance in the answers selected. That one question will not be 
removed from analyses, as certain calculations require there to be the same number of questions 
in each category. 
Participants answered most questions correctly, with a mean of 19.2 correct answers, or 
76.8%. No participants skipped a memory test question. Only two of the 15 stereotype-related 
questions were not answered correctly by at least 50% of participants; 37.9% and 49.5% of 
participants selected the correct answer for those items. All in all, there were no concerns of floor 
effects as the questions were not “too difficult” for the average participant to answer. 
Corrections for multiple comparisons. Because many of my analyses were ANOVAs, I 
corrected for the number of simple effects tests used in each set of post hoc analyses to explore 
any significant interactions. This was done to avoid increasing the type I error rate (i.e., the 
number of falsely significant tests). To do this, I used Bonferroni-corrected post hoc independent 
t-tests.  
Within-subjects analyses in the gay and lesbian conditions. Before conducting more 
complex analyses, I needed to look for the presence of guessing bias and SCB in the gay 
conditions. This is necessary because the stereotypical traits I used for gay characters in the story 
are counterstereotypical traits for heterosexual characters. As a result, without descriptive 
50 
 
analyses to examine memory differences, I would have no way of knowing if a difference in 
stereotypical scores between the gay and heterosexual character conditions is due to using gay 
stereotypes in the gay condition or avoiding gay stereotypes in the heterosexual condition. 
Because there were an equal number of stereotypical and counterstereotypical answers 
which could be selected as incorrect answers, I was able to directly compare them. As a 
reminder, guessing bias is potentially present if stereotypical inaccuracy exceeds other 
inaccuracy scores. When answering questions about two gay men, participants guessed an 
average of 0.80 incorrect stereotypical traits (SD = 0.71) and 0.72 incorrect counterstereotypical 
traits (SD = 0.79) out of seven questions. While participants did technically select more incorrect 
stereotypical answers (suggesting that guessing bias could be present), these means were not 
meaningfully different, t(24) = 0.385, p = 0.703, d = 0.11. While this indicates there may have 
been no guessing bias in the gay male condition, it should be noted that 64% of participants in 
this condition did select at least one incorrect, feminine trait. 
Similarly, when answering questions about two lesbians, participants incorrectly guessed 
an average of 0.42 stereotypical traits (SD = 0.86) and 0.73 counterstereotypical traits (SD = 
1.12). This difference was not significant, t(25) = 1.397, p = 0.175, and did not support the 
original hypothesis that there would be more incorrect stereotypical traits. Further, individuals 
rarely guessed stereotypical traits when reading about lesbian characters; only 27% of 
participants selected any incorrect, masculine traits. Together, the patterns here do not suggest 
guessing bias occurred for the gay or lesbian conditions. 
After not finding evidence of guessing bias in the gay conditions, I needed to check for 
the presence of SCB (or, alternatively, stereotype inhibition). There were an equal number of 
questions where the correct answer was stereotypical, counterstereotypical, or unknown (i.e., 
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“This information was not provided”). If SCB was present, participants would have remembered 
more stereotypical answers. 
Participants did not select the same number of stereotypical, counterstereotypical, and 
unknown correct answers according to a repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2,98) = 7.109, p < 
0.002, ηp
2  = 0.127, and there was an interaction between the number of answers selected and 
whether the participant was in the gay male or lesbian condition, F(2,98) = 3.385, p < 0.04, ηp
2
 = 
0.065. Participants in the gay male condition selected about the same number of correct 
stereotypes (M = 2.48, SD = 1.12), counterstereotypes (M = 2.68, SD = 0.90), and unknown 
answers (M = 2.68, SD = 0.95), so this does not provide any evidence for SCB in the gay male 
condition (see Figure 1). 
However, in the lesbian condition, participants selected significantly fewer correct 
stereotypes (M = 1.85, SD = 1.19) than correct counterstereotypes (M = 2.58, SD = 0.86), t(25) = 
2.906, p = 0.0235, or correct unknown answers (M = 3.00, SD = 1.23), t(25) = 3.953, p = 0.002 
(see Figure A). The number of counterstereotypes and unknown answers did not significantly 
differ, t(25) = 1.658, p = 0.330. This suggests that participants inhibited stereotypes (i.e., the use 











Figure 1. Stereotypic accuracy (feminine or masculine traits), counterstereotypic 
accuracy, and neutral accuracy for the gay male and lesbian conditions. * <0.05, ** < 0.01. 
 
 
Another way I checked for the presence of guessing bias and stereotype inhibition (in the 
gay and lesbian conditions) was by examining the incorrect answers participants selected when 
answering multiple-choice questions where the correct answer was “This information was not 
provided.” (referred to below as unknown questions). Guessing bias would cause participants to 
preferentially select stereotypical answers, while stereotype inhibition would cause participants 
to avoid stereotypical answers and perhaps prefer counterstereotypical answers. 
Because each “number of answers” variable is dependent on the other two variables (e.g., 
if a participant selects a stereotypical answer for a particular question, they are unable to select 
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the counterstereotypical or neutral answer), I could not use a repeated-measures ANOVA to 
determine if participants selected a different number of each type of answer. Instead, I compared 
the frequency of each type of incorrect answer to chance: if participants did not consider 
stereotypes when answering questions, they should choose an equal number of incorrect 
stereotypical, counterstereotypical, and neutral answers (i.e., 33% of each). 
Binomial tests indicated that, in the gay male condition, the proportion of incorrect 
answers that were stereotypical (0.152) was significantly below chance (0.333), p < 0.017; the 
proportion of counterstereotypical answers (0.515) was significantly above chance, p < 0.025; 
and the proportion of neutral answers (0.333) did not significantly differ from chance, p = 0.583 
(see Figure 2). This suggests that when answering questions about gay characters when they did 
not know the answer, participants avoided guessing stereotypes and preferentially guessed 
counterstereotypes. 
In the lesbian condition, the results of the binomial tests were not significant: the 
proportion of incorrect answers that were stereotypical (0.231), counterstereotypical (0.269), or 
neutral (0.5) did not significantly differ from chance; respectively, p = 0.186, p = 0.322, p = 
0.058 (see Figure 2). This may be because the sample was underpowered: 46% of participants in 
the lesbian condition did not get any of the unknown questions incorrect (vs. 20% of the gay 
male condition). The proportion of incorrect answers that were neutral (0.5) did approach 
statistical significance at p = 0.058, so participants may have preferred to select neutral answers 





Figure 2. When answering questions where the correct answer is, “This information was 
not provided,” participants could instead guess alternative stereotypical, counterstereotypical, 
and neutral answers. The black is line represents chance performance (0.333). * < 0.05. 
 
 
Altogether, there was evidence of stereotype inhibition when participants read about LGB 
characters, regardless of whether those characters were lesbians or gay men. However, the 
stereotype inhibition seems to function differently depending on the characters’ gender. 
Participants answering questions about lesbian characters avoided using stereotypes that were 
correct (i.e., stereotypical traits the characters genuinely had), while participants answering 
questions about gay male characters avoided guessing stereotypes. Meanwhile, I found no clear 
evidence of guessing bias. 
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Between-subjects analyses. While there was clear evidence of stereotype inhibition in 
the gay conditions, this did not clarify whether participants who read about gay characters 
remembered more or less information than participants in the heterosexual conditions (i.e., who 
read about heterosexual characters). I hypothesized that participants would recall feminine 
stereotypes more accurately in the gay male and heterosexual female conditions and they would 
recall masculine stereotypes more accurately in the lesbian and heterosexual male conditions. 
The conditions may have also affected how much participants guessed incorrect traits. 
For these analyses I used normalized scores so I could directly compare the different 
accuracy variables. A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that normalized accuracy variables 
significantly differed from each other, F(3.400, 346.814) = 3.968, p < 0.007, ηp
2 = 0.037. 
(Mauchly’s test indicated that this model violates the assumption of sphericity (Χ2(14) = 
161.302, p < 0.0001), so I used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.) Reading comprehension 
scores (normalized M = 0.097, real M = 8.60 out of 10), neutral accuracy scores (normalized M = 
0.095, real M = 2.41 out of 3), and feminine accuracy (main character) scores (normalized M = 
0.095, real M = 1.74 out of 2) were significantly larger than masculine accuracy for the main 
character (normalized M = 0.085, real M = 1.26 out of 2) and the romantic partner character 
(normalized M = 0.085, real M = 1.25 out of 2), as well as feminine accuracy (romantic partner) 
scores (normalized M = 0.077, real M = 0.87 out of 2). This suggests participants recalled neutral 
traits more accurately than masculine and (most) feminine traits or, alternatively, avoided 
selecting masculine and some feminine answers.  
To avoid issues with sphericity, I used a multivariate ANOVA to explore differences in 
these variables across conditions. I had hypothesized that the gender and sexual orientation of the 
main character would affect what information participants remembered. The pattern of variables 
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significantly varied on the basis of condition, F(18, 288) = 1.703, p = 0.037, ηp
2 = 0.097, but the 
pattern did not significantly vary on the basis of participant gender, F(6,96) = 0.312, p = 0.929. 
Regarding between-subjects effects, reading comprehension scores (F(3,99) = 1.302, p = 
0.278, ηp
2 = 0.038), neutral accuracy scores (F(3,99) = 1.832, p = 0.146, ηp
2 = 0.053), and both 
feminine accuracy scores (main character: F(3,99) = 0.205, p = 0.893, ηp
2 = 0.006; romantic 
partner: F(3,99) = 0.681, p = 0.566, ηp
2 = 0.020) did not show a statistically significant change 
on the basis of condition in the corrected model (i.e., comparing the four conditions as four 
different groups). Meanwhile, masculine accuracy scores did vary between conditions, for both 
the main character (F(3,99) = 3.096, p < 0.04, ηp
2 = 0.086) and their romantic partner (F(3,99) = 
2.820, p < 0.045, ηp
2 = 0.079). 
Breaking the model down into a 2 (character gender) by 2 (character sexual orientation) 
analysis explained these effects. For memory of the main character’s traits, masculine accuracy 
was significantly different depending on the character’s sexual orientation, F(1,99) = 5.265, p < 
0.025, ηp
2 = 0.051, but not because of the character’s gender, F(1,99) = 0.361, p = 0.549. The 
interaction between the two approached significance, F(1,99) = 3.680, p = 0.058, ηp
2 = 0.036. 
Masculine accuracy scores were highest when participants were recalling information about 
heterosexual female character (normalized M = 0.102, real M = 1.51 out of 2), in the middle for 
the male character (heterosexual male: normalized M = 0.090, real M = 1.33; gay male: 
normalized M = 0.086, real M = 1.28), and lowest for participants remembering the lesbian 
character (normalized M = 0.062, real M = 0.92; see Figure 3). Participants seemed to fail to 
recall masculine information about a lesbian character, suggesting some level of stereotype 
inhibition. Intriguingly, participants remembered masculine information best for a heterosexual 






Figure 3. The normed number of feminine and masculine traits participants recalled 
about the main character, grouped by the condition participants were in. 
 
 
The pattern was the opposite for memory of the romantic partner character’s traits: 
masculine accuracy scores were significantly different between gender conditions, F(1,99) = 
5.787, p < 0.02, ηp
2 = 0.055, but not sexual orientation conditions, F(1,99) = 0.955, p = 0.331; 
the interaction analysis was also non-significant, F(1,99) = 0.926, p = 0.338. This is because 
participants in the lesbian condition (normalized M = 0.063, real M = 0.928 out of 2) reported 
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significantly fewer correct masculine traits than the other three groups (normalized Ms = 0.084 to 




Figure 4. The normed number of feminine and masculine traits participants recalled 
about the romantic partner character, grouped by the condition participants were in. 
 
 
Looking at gender and sexual orientation separately also revealed another effect that was 
not obvious in the corrected model. Neutral accuracy scores significantly varied between the two 
sexual orientation conditions, F(1,99) = 4.691, p < 0.04, ηp
2 = 0.045. Participants reading about 
gay characters had significantly higher neutral accuracy scores (normalized M = 0.101, real M = 
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2.56 out of 3) than participants reading about heterosexual characters (M = 0.089, real M = 2.26). 
This may be because the majority (54.5%) of incorrect masculine answers selected (in questions 
where the correct answer was neutral) were in the heterosexual male condition. 
Correlational analyses. As a reminder, I measured implicit homophobia scores, multiple 
explicit homophobia scores, social desirability scores, familiarity with LGBT individuals, and 
demographic variables in an effort to determine what factors predicted stereotype use. To explore 
this, I focused on the number of masculine or feminine traits that participants had incorrectly 
selected in the gay and lesbian conditions. 
According to a stepwise linear multiple regression, the number of incorrect masculine 
traits guessed could be predicted by gay male homophobia scores (t(48) = 4.263, p < 0.001) and 
social desirability scores (t(48) = 3.048, p = 0.004), F(2,46) = 14.888, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.393. 
Incorrect masculine trait use could not be significantly predicted by Homophobia Scale scores, 
IAT scores, lesbian homophobia scores, knowing LGBT individuals, political views, religiosity, 
participant gender, or reading comprehension. 
However, the number of incorrect feminine traits guessed could only be predicted by 
reading comprehension scores, F(1,47) = 4.181, p = 0.047, R2 = 0.082. That is, higher feminine 
inaccuracy was related to worse reading comprehension, suggesting stereotyping and prejudice 
were not involved in the process of participants guessing feminine traits. 
Participants’ political views significantly positively correlated with Homophobia Scale 
scores, r(102) = 0.198, p < 0.05 and gay male homophobia scores, r(100) = 0.211, p < 0.04, but 
not lesbian homophobia scores, r(101) = 0.133, p = 0.187. Political views negatively correlated 
with implicit homophobia scores, r(101) = -0.259, p < 0.01, indicating a relationship between 
more conservative views and more homophobic scores.  
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As the previous between-subjects results suggested that participants generally engaged in 
stereotype inhibition (rather than guessing bias), I also explored what factors led participants to 
correctly recall masculine and feminine traits. However, I focused on the gay and lesbian 
conditions because recall of these traits is not meaningful in heterosexual conditions. 
For participants who read about a gay male couple, feminine accuracy scores negatively 
correlated with Homophobia Scale scores, r(25) = -0.442, p = 0.027, and gay male homophobia 
(ATGL-S) scores, r(24) = -0.508. (There was a marginally significant negative correlation with 
lesbian homophobia scores, r(25) = -0.388, p = 0.055, but this was likely because of the strong 
correlation between the two ATGL-S scores, r(24) = 0.623, p = 0.001). Masculine accuracy 
scores did not significantly correlate with either explicit homophobia score (Homophobia Scale: 
r(25) = 0.035, p = 0.869; ATGL-S gay male: r(24) = -0.294, p = 0.162). This is a negative 
relationship, which means explicitly homophobic participants selected fewer correct feminine 
traits (i.e., stereotype inhibition). 
Meanwhile, the opposite pattern was true for participants who read about a lesbian 
couple. Masculine accuracy scores significantly negatively correlated with Homophobia Scale 
scores, r(26) = -0.443, p = 0.023, while feminine accuracy scores did not, r(26) = -0.133, p = 
0.516. Again, higher explicit homophobia scores seemed to lead to stereotype inhibition.  
This relationship is surprising. According to Devine’s 1989 model of stereotype 
activation, stereotypes automatically activate (in most situations), and low-prejudice individuals 
choose to inhibit those stereotypes. People inhibit stereotypes during the recall or recognition 
stage of memory, and this takes time to occur (Radvansky, Copeland, & von Hippel, 2010). I 
conducted follow-up analyses to explore this unexpected relationship. 
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Understanding stereotype inhibition. In the gay male condition, I found less evidence 
for stereotype inhibition, especially in analyses of the feminine accuracy score. Thus, I focused 
on the lesbian condition, where participants avoided selecting correct stereotypical answers. 
In the lesbian condition, the correlation between Homophobia Scale scores and masculine 
accuracy scores was r(26) = -0.443, p = 0.023. This was significantly larger than the same 
correlation in the gay male condition (r(25) = 0.032, p = 0.879), z = -1.703, p = 0.044; and 
significantly larger than the correlation in the straight male condition (r(27) = 0.279, p = 0.159), 
z = -2.613, p = 0.004. However, the lesbian correlation did not significantly differ from the 
correlation in the straight female condition (r(25) = -0.305, p = 0.138), z = -0.540, p = 0.295.  
This is difficult to interpret, as masculine accuracy in the lesbian condition is all 
stereotypical, while masculine accuracy in the straight female condition is half stereotypical (for 
the male romantic partner character) and half counterstereotypical (for the female main 
character). However, I was also able to see the relationship between the separated masculine 
accuracy scores and the Homophobia Scale scores. For information about the main character, 
masculine accuracy correlated with Homophobia Scale scores for the lesbian condition (r(26) = -
0.481, p = 0.013), but not for the straight female condition (r(25) = 0.268, p = 0.195), and these 
correlations were significantly different in magnitude, z = -0.837, p = 0.201. (The correlations 
between the romantic partner masculine accuracy and Homophobia Scale scores did not 
significantly vary, z = 0.053, p = 0.479, and neither were statistically significant.)  
Gender effects. While I hypothesized that participant gender would significantly impact 
stereotype use (for heterosexual participants), this did not turn out to be the case. There were 
some differences in demographics and homophobia scores: women (M = 2.97, SD = 0.954) 
leaned more politically left than men (M = 2.58, SD = 0.781), t(100) = 2.211, p = -0.029, d = 
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0.671, had lower Homophobia Scale scores (M = 34.70, SD = 11.83) than men (M = 43.72, SD = 
14.88), t(99) = 2.224, p < 0.002, d = 0.447, and had marginally lower IAT scores (M = -0.367, 
SD = 0.393) than men (M = -0.522, SD = 0.393), t(100) = 1.901, p = 0.60, d = 0.394.  
While Homophobia Scale and IAT scores did correlate to stereotype recall, and men and 
women differed (to an extent) on those measures, male and female participants did not 
significantly vary in their feminine accuracy for the main character (t(101) = 0.639, p = 0.524) or 
the main character’s romantic partner (t(101) = 0.161, p = 0.873). The same applies to their 
masculine accuracy for the main character (t(101) = 0.399, p = 0.690) and the romantic partner 
(t(101) = 0.864, p = 0.389). As previously mentioned, gender did not interact with character 
gender or sexual orientation for these variables or for measures of guessing bias.  
Reading times. For the reading time data, one reading time was removed because it was 
more than 3.0 standard deviations above the mean (based on conservative suggestions by van 
Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994). In addition, one participant’s reading times were <100ms, so all of 
those reading times were removed from analyses. Another two participants’ reading time data 
was lost due to computer error. 
The sentences used in these analyses were the critical sentence and two “surprise” 
sentences (which contained unexpected but non-gendered) information that were all the same 
number of syllables. Reading times can reflect how surprising a particular sentence was, as 
participants take additional time to process the information it contained.  
In a repeated-measures ANOVA, the reading time significantly varied between the three 
sentences, F(2,97) = 26.836, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.356. Participants took significantly longer to read 
the critical sentence (M = 6.51 seconds, SD =2.62s) compared to the second surprise sentence (M 
= 4.79s, SD = 1.54s), t(99) = 6.264, p < 0.00001, d = 0.63. However, reading time for the first 
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surprise sentence (M = 6.18s, SD = 2.46s) was not significantly different from the critical 
sentence reading time, t(99) = 0.650, p = 0.517. (Participants also took significantly less time to 
read the second surprise sentence than the first surprise sentences, t(99) = 5.527, p < 0.00001, d 
= 0.55) 
One explanation for why the critical sentence did not differ from the first surprise 
sentence is that the mean for the critical sentence includes the reading times from the 
heterosexual conditions, and revealing a character is heterosexual is likely not surprising. Indeed, 
the interaction between reading times and character sexual orientation was significant, F(2,194) 
= 7.852, p < 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.075. Participants generally read the second surprise sentence at a 
similar speed (heterosexual conditions: M = 4.76s, SD = 1.55s; gay conditions: M = 4.83s, SD = 
1.55s), as well as the first surprise sentence (heterosexual conditions: M = 5.99s, SD = 2.23s; gay 
conditions: M = 6.61s, SD = 3.19s), while participants in the gay condition (M = 7.52s, SD = 
2.95s) took significantly longer to read the critical sentence than participants reading about 
heterosexual characters (M = 5.48s, SD = 1.75s; see Figure Z). (This is especially true for 
participants reading a sentence revealing the main character is a lesbian; M = 7.93s, SD = 3.08s) 




Figure 5. The mean reading time it took participants to read the surprise sentences and 
the critical sentence, in milliseconds. 
 
 
Participant responses. Participants reported they enjoyed the story the most if the main 
character was male (M = 4.27, SD = 0.992) compared to female (M = 3.84, SD = 0.903), F(1,95) 
= 4.687, p = 0.033, ηp
2 = 0.047, regardless of the participant’s gender (F(1,95) = 0.333, p = 
0.566) or the character’s sexual orientation (F(1,95) = 1.120, p = 0.293). Similarly, participants 
found the story more boring when the main character was female (M = 2.51, SD = 1.065) versus 
male (M = 1.92, SD = 1.250), F(1,95) = 5.334, p = 0.023, ηp
2 = 0.053. Overall men participants 
(M = 2.56, SD = 1.361) found the story more boring than women participants (M = 2.03, SD = 
1.058) did, F(1,95) = 4.759, p = 0.032, ηp
2 = 0.048, perhaps because of the story’s plot line. 
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What participants enjoyed the least about the story did not significantly vary between 
conditions, X2(21) = 16.036, p = 0.768.  
For individual characters, in a repeated-measures ANOVA, participants liked the main 
character (M = 3.57, SD = 1.168) significantly more than the romantic partner character (M = 
3.21, SD = 1.419), F(1,95) = 8.044, p = 0.006, ηp
2 = 0.078. However, this interacted with 
character sexual orientation, F(1,95) = 4.113, p = 0.045, ηp
2 = 0.041. Participants liked the main 
character more as a gay character (M = 3.76, SD = 1.106) than as a heterosexual character (M = 
3.38, SD = 1.207), while the opposite pattern held true for the romantic partner character when 
gay (M = 3.04, SD = 1.385) versus heterosexual (M = 3.25, SD = 1.250). Favorite character was 
not significantly related to condition (X2(9) = 15.212, p = 0.085) or participant gender (X2(3) = 
6.147, p = 0.105) but this may be because about 57% of participants selected a female side 
character, Jessica, as their favorite.  
Qualitative analyses. For “fill-in-the-blank” recall questions, two research assistants 
coded each answer as belonging to a certain category. For example, when coding participants’ 
answers to the question “What hair color did Michael have?”, the raters could select “black/dark 
hair,” “blonde hair,” “brown/light brown/brunette hair,” “red/strawberry blonde hair,” 
“participant did not include an answer,” or “other/participant put multiple colors.” (See 
Appendix J for other rating schemes.) The inter-rater reliability was 0.925, with disagreements 
resolved by me. 
For the majority of “short answer” recall questions, I first read through all participant 
responses and developed coding criteria based on themes I consistently found in the responses. 
Using this criteria, two research assistants coded the responses. In one example, participants 
wrote a short answer to the question, “What surprised you the most in the story?” These 
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responses were summarized into categories such as: “The main character choosing to forgive 
their partner and moving in with them,” “The main character liking or listening to an annoying 
side character,” “This character’s sexual orientation,” and a few others (see Appendix J). Besides 
those coding categories, raters could also select “participant did not include an answer” or 
“other” (which required a short explanation). 
However, this coding strategy would not work for certain open-ended recall questions. 
For behavioral descriptions, participants answered questions like, “Describe how the main 
character acted.” While I originally intended for this question to focus on personality traits (e.g., 
the main character was depicted as “frustrated by people who disrespected his authority,” which 
is a masculine stereotype), participants described both behaviors and emotions in addition to 
personality traits. Coding these open-ended responses was further complicated because 
participants rarely used terms from the story. For example, when describing the main character, 
participant responses included a variety of terms such as: “stubborn and controlling,” 
“headstrong,” “a control freak,” “bossy,” “stern and peremptory,” and “assertive.” While all of 
these descriptions target the same trait – suggesting I could categorize them all as one type of 
response – I could lose important nuance in the specific word choices that participants used. The 
descriptor bossy seems to have a gender-neutral definition, but has received significant news 
coverage for its gendered, sexist connotations (Sterbenz, 2014). Thus, when exploring stereotype 
use, how traits are described may be more important than what traits are described. 
To account for these two issues, I had two research assistants code for the number of each 
type of traits (i.e., personality trait, behavior, or emotion) and rate 1) how positive or negative the 
description is, and 2) how certain the participant seems to be in their description. Secondly, 
another research assistant extracted all adjectives and trait nouns that participants used to 
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describe the characters, sorted by condition, participant gender, and participant sexual 
orientation. I treated this data qualitatively (examining general trends in the data), while also 
looking at word frequency.  
Participants varied in how many behaviors (M = 0.455, SD = 0.866), emotions (M = 
1.406, SD = 1.305), and personality traits (M = 1.594, SD = 1.218) they used to describe the main 
character, F(2,186) = 25.983, p < 0.00001, ηp
2 = 0.218. This pattern of descriptors did not vary 
between character gender (F(2,186) = 1.146, p = 0.320), character sexual orientation (F(2,186) = 
0.666, p = 0.515), or participant gender (F(2,186) = 2.279, p = 0.105). 
For descriptions of the romantic partner, personality traits (M = 1.677, SD = 1.244) were 
more common than emotions (M = 0.745, SD = 1.050), F(2,188) = 45.185, p < 0.00001, ηp
2 = 
0.325. However, this factor did interact with participant gender and condition, F(6,188) = 2.614, 
p = 0.019. 
I broke this interaction down by which each category of behavioral trait. Men described 
the most behaviors about a straight woman, (M = 0.667, SD = 0.651), while women described the 
most behaviors about a straight man (M = 0.529, SD = 1.068). Meanwhile, both groups avoided 
describing a gay man. Men described an average of 0.143 behaviors (SD = 0.378), while not a 
single woman reading about gay male characters described a behavior. 
For emotions, the pattern looked very different. Men described the most emotions when 
talking about a straight man (M = 0.875, SD = 1.126). Across the board, women (M = 0.879, SD 
= 1.089) described more emotions than men did (M = 0.500, SD = 0.941). However, women used 
the most emotions to describe the gay male character (M = 1.000, SD = 1.138), while men did 
not describe the gay man with any emotions. The opposite was true for personality traits. Men 
used the most personality traits to describe the gay male character (M = 2.714, SD = 1.113), 
68 
 
while women used the least (M = 1.444, SD = 1.247). Women applied the most personality traits 
to a straight woman (M = 2.071, SD = 1.439), and men applied the fewest to the lesbian version 
of the character (M = 1.111, SD = 0.782). 
This data suggests that men and women participants used different categories of traits - 
depending on sexual orientation - when describing how a character “acted.” Men described their 
ingroup using emotions, while women used personality traits for their ingroup. Behaviors were 
used to describe heterosexual characters opposite the participants’ gender. When describing how 
a gay man acted, men used personality traits, while women used emotions; an opposite pattern to 
how they described their ingroups. 
Looking at the specific words that participants used, there was a notable pattern of 
women participants using particular words that men did not use. When describing the romantic 
partner character, women used words like “kind,” “loving” or “lovable,” “selfish,” “selfless,” 
and “sweet.” No men participants used these terms (except for “loving” - one male participant 
used this term, compared to 10 women). These terms all describe traits that are stereotypical for 
women or feminine individuals.  
Meanwhile, participants also varied in how they described the male or the female version 
of the romantic partner. The male version (“Andrew”) was described as “avoiding confrontation” 
or “nonconfrontational” (claiming over 70% uses of the phrase), and “impulsive” (100%). 
Women participants frequently used “immature”, “sad,” and “scared” to describe the gay male 
version of the character, describing both the gay man and lesbian character as “careless.”  
Men avoided using terms like “caring” and “considerate,” primarily when describing the 
straight male version of the character. No participants referred to the straight male character as 
“emotional,” albeit it being a common term in other conditions. Men and women talked about 
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this version of the character in different ways; men used “excited” (which women did not use at 
all in this condition), while women used “happy” (used only by one man). “Happiness” is a fairly 
gendered concept: both cultural expectations and some undergraduates’ personal beliefs included 
that men both experience and express happiness less than women (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & 
Devine, 2000). Women (who are “allowed” to openly experience happiness) may feel more 
comfortable using that term to describe a character who is expected not to exhibit happiness. 
Patterns for word choices about the main character were similar, if not as striking. 
Women participants described the main character as “happy” much more often (especially when 
she was straight and female), while only men used the term “excited.” Of participants who 
described the character as “loving” or “lovable” or “in love,” 93% were women. The gay male 
version of the character was described as “emotional,” “sad,” and, notably, “bitchy.” Another 
interesting pattern is that only men participants used the term “confused,” and only to describe 
the lesbian version of the character. Lesbians and bisexual women are frequently perceived as 
being “confused” about their sexual orientation (Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006). 
Physical descriptions of the characters had a similar issue to behavioral: participants 
primarily used neutral characteristics (like hair color), but rarely used the exact wording from the 
story. For example, the story mentioned a character was “a thin (wo)man, slightly skinnier than 
average.” Skinny is a feminine stereotype. Participant responses included “slim,” “a bit skinny,” 
“underweight,” “very thin,” “slender,” “abnormally skinny,” and having “a small physique.” 
While skinny is a feminine stereotype, it was difficult to determine whether some of the 
responses matched that particular stereotype. So, instead of coding the number of correct 
answers and stereotypes included, I focused on what types of traits participants recalled 
(especially traits linked to stereotypes: physical build, weight, voice characteristics, and hair 
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length), as well as the total number of traits listed. Two undergraduates also rated the positivity 
and certainty of the physical descriptions, as they had done with the personality descriptions.  
According to ratings by undergraduates, participants described the romantic partner’s 
physical appearance (M = 3.075, SD = 0.304) significantly more positively than that of the main 
character (M = 2.968, SD = 0.311) according to a repeated-measures ANOVA, F(1,85) = 5.576, 
p = 0.020, ηp
2 = 0.062. However, most participants described appearance neutrally (82.5 - 
86.4%), so this may not be meaningful. Appearance did not significantly interact with character 
sexual orientation (F(1,85) = 0.130, p = 0.719), character gender (F(1,85) = 0.471, p = 0.494), or 
participant gender (F(1,85) = 0.205, p = 0.652). Similar, for behavior, participants’ descriptions 
were rated significantly more positive for the romantic partner (M = 3.020, SD = 0.696) than for 
the main character (M = 2.760, SD = 0.712), F(1,92) = 9.711, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.095). This is 
interesting considering participants reporting liking the main character more. Liking the romantic 
partner was positively correlated with describing their behavior positively, r(101) = 0.311, p = 
0.002, but not with the appearance description, r(94) = -0.069, p = 0.511. Regarding the content 
of the physical descriptions, the main character received 352 physical traits, while the romantic 
partner only received 260 (despite both characters having the same number of traits ascribed to 
them in the story).  
For the most surprising aspect of the story, participant responses varied by condition, but 
this was not quite significant, X2(18) = 27.991, p = 0.062. All participants who were surprised the 
most by the character’s sexual orientation (12.6% of participants) were in the gay and lesbian 
conditions. 
An unexpected finding was that when asked to describe the race of the characters 
(included as a filler question), most participants answered this question incorrectly. In particular, 
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the main character of the story was explicitly described as Cambodian (Southeast Asian), but 
only 27.2% of participants wrote a correct answer. The most common description was white (or 
European/Caucasian), from 43.7% of participants. Intriguingly, this did not significantly vary on 
the basis of participant race, X2(25) = 20.926, p = 0.697. Indeed, of the 28 participants who 
identified as Asian, Asian-American, or Middle-Eastern, 39.2% indicated that the main character 





          The purpose of this thesis was to more closely examine the finding from previous research 
that people generally use guessing bias – instead of stereotype-consistency bias – when recalling 
information about LGBT characters in narratives. I hypothesized that the results from these 
previous studies were primarily due to methodological choices such as the following: the main 
character’s sexual orientation was not revealed until after reading (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; 
Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), all tasks were recognition-based (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & 
Woll, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), LGBT participants were 
kept in during data analysis, the materials and instructions used were not naturalistic, and the 
researchers assumed that traits which are stereotypical for gay individuals are 
counterstereotypical for heterosexual individuals. Some of the studies also did not adequately 
measure SCB or guessing bias (Clark & Woll, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007). Finally, many 
of these methodological choices were not in line with other SCB research (Fyock & Stangor, 
1994; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). 
          While I addressed many of these methodological issues in this thesis, my study did not 
find evidence to support SCB or guessing bias. Participants who read about lesbian characters 
recalled significantly fewer masculine traits, compared to participants in the other three 
conditions. Within-subjects analyses of the gay and lesbian conditions revealed that participants 
selected fewer correct stereotypical answers about lesbian characters than expected, and they 
avoided guessing stereotypes about gay male characters. If participants were exhibiting SCB, 
they would select more correct stereotypical answers. For guessing bias, participants would 
select more incorrect stereotypes. 
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Rather, participants consistently exhibited stereotype inhibition. As part of Devine’s 1989 
stereotype activation theory, individuals with knowledge of cultural stereotypes automatically 
activate those stereotypes (when relevant), and low-prejudice individuals must choose to inhibit 
them. Participants avoided using stereotypes to answer questions about gay characters - 
especially lesbian characters - even when those stereotypes were correct. This could be a 
consequence of social desirability, where participants did not provide stereotypical answers to 
avoid being seen as someone who stereotypes. This explanation could especially be true when, 
during the 2010s, it became increasingly socially unacceptable to be openly homophobic 
(Fingerhut, 2016). However, this is not a perfect explanation as the selection of masculine or 
feminine traits did not significantly correlate with social desirability scores, and social 
desirability scores were lower here than in previous studies. 
          Another explanation is that this could be due to cohort differences. Most prior LGB SCB 
research was conducted in the late 1970s (Bellezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll, 1981; Snyder 
& Uranowitz, 1978), when homophobia and other prejudices were much more common and 
socially acceptable. For context, the most recent LGB SCB study was run in 2006, only two 
years after same-sex marriage was first legalized in the United States (in the state of 
Massachusetts), and individuals were still more homophobic then than they are now (Masci, 
Brown, & Kiley, 2017). It is possible that young adults now - especially at a racially diverse 
university (U.S. News, 2018) in a Democrat-leaning county (The New York Times, 2017) - 
make an effort to inhibit stereotypes, when previous young adults did not. Although, this idea is 
not supported by the fact that the Homophobia Scale scores were significantly higher in this 
sample than in the 1999 sample (Wright et al., 1999). I also accounted for the possibility of 
social desirability bias (a significant issue in social psychological research) by measuring it; 
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social desirability scores did not significantly correlate with any other measures, suggesting it did 
not play a significant role in participant responses.  
However, recall for masculine and feminine traits tended to negatively correlate with 
explicit homophobia scores, such that explicitly homophobic individuals recalled fewer 
stereotypical traits. While I consistently found this pattern across multiple conditions, I can only 
draw limited conclusions from this finding. Nearly 14% of participants selected “strongly 
disagree” (or, for reverse-coded questions, “strongly agree”), while 71.8% of participants 
averaged selecting “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” for every question. Thus, I can 
only interpret 14.6% of my sample as being “explicit homophobic,” but still moderately. Perhaps 
low-prejudice participants do not feel the need to inhibit stereotypes (due to their egalitarian 
beliefs), while moderate-prejudice individuals have more pronounced stereotypical beliefs and 
would need to exert effort to inhibit those stereotypes. If this is the case, I would expect high-
prejudice individuals would show little to no stereotype inhibition (i.e., a quadratic relationship), 
but I am unable to determine this with my current sample. Future research should aim to recruit 
moderate- and high-prejudice individuals to explore this. 
Further, I suspect participants were only able to inhibit stereotypes because of the 
cognitive resources they had available while answering questions about the story (which is when 
stereotype inhibition typically occurs; Radvansky, Copeland, & von Hippel, 2010). When living 
in a society that promotes stereotypical beliefs (such as the United States; Devine, 1989), 
stereotype inhibition typically benefits marginalized communities, especially as removing the 
automatic influence of stereotypes is difficult. Consequently, understanding what circumstances 
lead to inhibiting stereotypes - and give individuals the cognitive resources to do so - is very 




One limitation of this thesis was that I did not include various measures that could more 
closely examine stereotype inhibition. For example, this experiment did not have a condition 
where participants were under cognitive load, so I could not determine whether participants were 
able to inhibit stereotypes because of the availability of cognitive resources. Also, stereotype 
inhibition could also be examined by looking at reaction times to probe words that can be 
presented while people read (e.g., Radvansky, Copeland, & von Hippel, 2010). 
Other limitations of this research include the use of a convenience sample of 
undergraduates at UNLV may limit generalizability of the findings. While my sample was 
minority white, it was still otherwise a sample from a “WEIRD” population (Western, educated, 
industrialized, rich, and democratic; Rad, Martingano, & Ginges, 2018). 
Another limitation was that participants read only one story; this was done to avoid 
making the experimental manipulation noticeable. However, the use of only one story meant that 
I could not measure how the same participant may respond differently to gay or heterosexual 
characters, to male or female characters, or to when sexual orientation is revealed. Additionally, 
the story itself may have been flawed in some way that affected participants’ responses. 
However, one note is that all of the previous LGBT SCB research relied on a single narrative 
(Bellezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll, 1981; McGann & Goodwin, 2007; Snyder & 
Uranowitz, 1978). Finally, the story from my experiment included an updated set of stereotypes 
(based on ratings from a different group of people than the ones who participated in the 
experiment). While I did this to ensure that the stereotypes were up to date, it also meant that this 




 For my thesis experiment, I hypothesized that both guessing bias and SCB are used when 
remembering information about lesbian and gay characters. However, that hypothesis did not 
receive much support; instead, participants tended to inhibit gay and lesbian stereotypes. 
Future studies could address some of my study’s limitations by including measures 
specifically designed to measure stereotype inhibition and creating additional conditions where 
participants are under cognitive load. As mentioned, including high-prejudice participants in 
future research would also provide a broader understanding of this area. These three additions 
would provide further understanding of how and why stereotype inhibition and stereotype use 
occur. 
Cognitive load is an especially important aspect of this line of research. Stereotype use 
increases when working memory is otherwise occupied (i.e., when someone is under cognitive 
load) during encoding (e.g., Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993). This is because people rely 
on heuristics to interpret incoming information when they have limited ability to process that 
information. This suggests individuals primarily use stereotypes when encoding new information 
(i.e., when creating or editing their situation models). However, research has also found 
stereotype-consistency bias is stronger when participants freely recall a character’s behaviors 
than when they complete a recognition task for those behaviors (Sherman & Frost, 2000). 
Because people rely on retrieval more for free recall tasks, this suggests the opposite, that they 
primarily use stereotypes when retrieving information. Limited research has explored how 
increased cognitive load on retrieval affects stereotype use, but it seems to increase stereotype 




However, SCB may not be used for LGBT stereotypes regardless. Gender and race are 
almost always very visible characteristics in real-world interactions, and they are constantly 
salient when learning about other people. Sexual orientation or transgender status are frequently 
hidden, sometimes for years, and even if someone knows a friend is gay, they might not be 
reminded of that as often as they would be of the friend’s gender and race. With this explanation, 
participants are not used to constantly keeping in mind a character’s sexual orientation and will 
not use that knowledge when encoding character information. 
Another avenue of research that could further explore this topic is manipulating when the 
main characters of the stories reveal their sexual orientation. In prior LGB SCB research, 
individuals seemed to rely more on guessing bias than other strategies (such as stereotype-
consistency bias) when remembering information about LGB characters. However, in the 
majority of these studies, sexual orientation was revealed after participants had finished reading. 
This may be why guessing bias is more prevalent; engaging in SCB may require knowing a 
character is gay for a person to preferentially encode stereotypical information while reading 
about that character (in conjunction with reduced cognitive resources). Additionally, exploring 
how the timing of a sexual orientation reveal affects memory is important; in real-world 
situations, people might learn an individual belongs to the LGBT community immediately or 
they might not find out for years. 
This thesis focused on stereotyping of lesbian and gay characters – in line with prior 
research – but did not cover how participants might respond to bisexual, transgender, or gender-
nonconforming characters. The stereotype ratings survey indicated that bisexual stereotypes only 
partially overlap with gay stereotypes, so participants might remember information about them 
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differently. While it is important to examine these different sexual orientations in future studies, 
including all of them in a single study may make the study overly complex.  
I was interested in looking at what incorrect answer participants were more likely to 
choose for each question. For example, participants may choose more stereotypical incorrect 
answers when the correct answer is counterstereotypical than when the correct answer is neutral, 
because of a failure to encode counterstereotypical information. However, my experiment did not 
use enough questions for me to be able to examine this, but I would like to do so in future 
research. 
Conclusion 
For the 4-12% of Americans who identify as LGBT – and 7-20% of young adults – 
prejudice in everyday life can lead to stress, depression, low self-esteem, and even physical harm 
(Callender, 2015; Gates, 2017; GLAAD, 2017) in addition to discrimination they may 
experience. Because anti-LGBT prejudice still widely exists, developing methods to help reduce 
that prejudice is important. My thesis focused on what causes people to use stereotypes about 
lesbian and gay individuals. My primary findings suggest that, at least in the population I 
sampled from, most participants inhibited gay and lesbian stereotypes. This is a promising step 
towards reducing prejudice in the United States; hopefully having a better understanding of these 
issues will be useful when creating interventions to decrease use of stereotypes for LGBT 





Appendix A: Short Story 
This is the male main character/female romantic partner version of the short story. Critical 
sentences (i.e., surprises in the story) are indicated in bold font, and character traits are pointed 
out in curvy brackets. 
 
1. Michael was heading towards his car after a long day at work. 
2. Michael was a business coordinator, and that day he was training a new employee who 
kept ignoring his instructions, which was frustrating. 
3. He couldn’t help but be easily frustrated by people who disrespected his authority. 
{lesbian behavioral stereotype: dominance} 
4. He was going to hang out with his friend Chris for a while, before going home to get 
ready for his date that night 
5. Michael looked in his window as he approached his car and caught a glimpse of himself. 
6. He was a thin man, slightly skinnier than the average {gay male physical stereotype: 
thin}, and had brown eyes {neutral physical trait: brown eyes}. 
7. He looked just like his mother, who had left Cambodia {neutral physical 
characteristic: Asian} right before the genocide there in the ‘70s. 
8. Michael felt like he looked pretty muscular, too, despite his thin stature {lesbian 
physical characteristic: muscular/athletic}; he swam for an hour every morning before 
work. {neutral behavioral characteristic: swimmer} 
9. He’d been on the swim team in college, and still loved to swim as much as he could. 
80 
 
10. Michael thought about how excited he was for his date that night – he wanted to talk 
about how upsetting the new employee was, and ask for advice on how to deal with her. 
{gay male behavioral stereotype: open about feelings} 
11. All of a sudden, his Bluetooth announced, “You have a call from: Jessica.” 
12. Michael felt immediate disappointment – that was the new employee calling. 
13. She was supposed to be staying late to finish up some paperwork in the office, and 
Michael couldn’t help but wonder if she’d made another mistake. 
14. Michael hit the answer button, and Jessica’s cheery voice came on. 
15. “Hiiii Michael!” she said, and Michael almost rolled his eyes. “I was finishing those 
technology purchase forms you assigned to me, and I emailed them to the IT department 
since that’s what we did in my old job, but I got a reply that’s not the department you’re 
supposed to send those to, and I can’t figure out if I’m actually supposed to send them to 
the purchasing manager--” 
16. Michael cut her off before she could continue. “I told you to submit those online through 
the business portal.” 
17. “Mhm,” Jessica said, “like, I knowww you said to do that, but I thought it would work 
better to send them through IT, since that’s what my old company did and they could 
approve purchases that--” 
18. Michael tried not to sigh. “When you submit a hardware purchase request form through 
the portal, it gets submitted directly to the IT personnel responsible for approving those 
requests. You sent the forms to the helpdesk instead, who aren’t in charge of doing that. 
Please just follow the link that I emailed you earlier…” 
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19. Michael could have probably tolerated Jessica’s disregard for his instructions if she 
didn’t draw out so many words when talking. 
20. Finally, Michael was able to get off the phone, right as he pulled up the bar that he was 
meeting Chris at. 
21. He spotted Chris’s Chrysler in the parking lot, and parked next to it. 
22. Chris was Michael’s best friend; he was a slightly taller than Michael, and had dark skin 
with black curly hair. {neutral physical traits: dark skin; black curly hair} 
23. He had a stocky look to him, not really caring about his physique as much as Michael 
did.  
24. The two of them had grown up in the same neighborhood and they were both on sports 
teams throughout high school, so they saw each other a lot. 
25. Michael spotted Chris sitting at the bar, so he walked up behind him and said, “Hey, 
man!” 
26. Chris turned around and grinned. “Hey, dude! It’s been way too long since we last hung 
out.” 
27. Michael sat down next to him and agreed, asking Chris, “So how’s work been going for 
you?” 
28. “Same as always, you know how it is,” Chris said. “My boss has been pretty chill lately, 
which is nice. What about you? You have that new employee you’re dealing with, 
right?” 
29. Michael groaned. “Don’t get me started, dude,” he said. “She never listens to me.” 
30. Chris laughed. “You used to be so annoying about that in high school – you wanted 
everyone to do what you said. What’s so bad about her?” 
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31.  Michael was halfway through complaining about Jessica’s antics when from behind 
him, he heard a loud, “Michael!!! Is that you?!” 
32. At Michael’s horrified face, Chris raised his eyebrows and guessed, “Speak of the 
devil?” 
33. Jessica pulled out the empty chair beside Michael and immediately sat down. “Oh my 
gosh, it is!” she exclaimed. “Who’s your friend?! I’m Jessica! I work with Michael.” 
34. “I’m Chris; I’ve known Michael since high school. It’s good to meet you,” Chris said, 
smiling. 
35. “I thought you would still be working on those forms, Jessica,” Michael said, trying not 
to sound sarcastic. 
36. “I finished them all up right after I called you!” Jessica enthused. “So I thought I’d come 
get a drink and some tortilla chips. They have low-fat ones here!” 
37. “They’re actually really good tortilla chips,” Chris commented. 
38. “Well,” Michael said, “I’m sure you’d rather eat chips with your friends instead of us, 
Jessica.” 
39. “Nooo, but I want to see who you hang out with!” Jessica enthused. 
40. Somehow, Michael got sucked into a conversation with Jessica and Chris about their 
current project at work. 
41. After tolerating Jessica’s presence for a while, Michael checked his phone and realized 
the battery had died. “Hey, Chris, what time is it?” 
42. Chris looked down at his watch. “Uhh, it’s—“ 
43. “6:20PM!” Jessica said enthusiastically, as she looked down at her own watch, 
surrounded by numerous bracelets along her wrist. 
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44. Michael tried not to roll his eyes again. 
45. “Yeah, I need to head out now,” Michael said. “I’m busy tonight. I’ll see you later, 
Chris.” 
46. Michael heard Jessica’s voice from behind him as he left – “Bye, Michael!!!” – and he 
rolled his eyes. 
47. Michael was excited to finally get back home to his girlfriend, Ashley, who he’d 
been dating for three years. 
48. Every time he thought about her and her frizzy, short brown hair, he couldn’t help but 
smile. {lesbian physical stereotype: short hair; neutral physical trait: frizzy, brown hair} 
49. He felt lost in the sound of her soft, angelic voice every time she spoke. {gay male 
physical stereotypes: soft/high-pitched voice} 
50. Ashley also had big blue eyes that no one could miss. {neutral physical characteristic: 
blue eyes} 
51. He was in love, a feeling so strong that he was incapacitated by the very thought of 
losing her. 
52. There was no one in the world that he cared about as much as he did for her. 
53. It took Michael ten minutes to get home from the bar, and he ran upstairs to his third 
floor apartment to see Ashley. 
54. Michael dropped his keys off by the front door, and he was disappointed to realize 
Ashley’s keys weren’t there, meaning she wasn’t home. 
55. Normally Ashley got home a couple hours before Michael, since she got off from her 
job at a research lab at 4pm. 
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56. Michael hadn’t gotten any texts from Ashley today, so he didn’t know if she was busy 
doing something – maybe she was trying to surprise him for their date tonight. 
57. While Michael started putting on his outfit for their date, he found a teddy bear in their 
closet behind a pile of clothes; Ashley was always a little bit messy. {neutral behavioral 
stereotype: somewhat untidy} 
58. The teddy bear made Michael think back to his first date with Ashley. 
59. He’d first met Ashley in his junior year of college, when they were assigned to be 
partners in the same English class.  
60. She was wearing the same outfit that she had worn on their first date: a Guns N’ Roses 
T-shirt, ripped jeans, and combat boots, and Michael thought she looked really hot. 
61. Michael had made a comment about his favorite song from that band, and Ashley had 
smiled – she said it was her favorite band. 
62. Ashley had asked him out on a date once their presentation was over. 
63. They went to a local carnival, and Michael had to convince Ashley to go on some of the 
scarier rides. 
64. “It’ll be fun, I promise!” Michael had exclaimed, trying to pry Ashley’s hands off the 
fence she was clinging to. 
65. “It goes upside down!” Ashley had argued, but she was smiling. “We’re not supposed to 
go upside down, Michael!” 
66. Michael eventually convinced her to give the carnival ride a try, and she got through it 
without throwing up, which had been in a win in Michael’s book. 
67. After that, Michael had spotted a game for them to play. 
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68. He gestured Ashley over who was all too ready to exact a bit of revenge for the previous 
ordeal. 
69. They threw darts; Ashley’s darts were striking on target and did not waver despite 
Michael’s protests; she was very competitive. 
70. She won taking her prized stuffed teddy bear, the object Michael was trying to win for 
her, and during the rest of the date kept reminding Michael how she won the bear. 
71. Ashley had kept the teddy bear for all these years, and Michael thought it was so cute. 
72. Michael had been home for over half an hour when he got a phone call from Ashley. 
73. “Ashley!” Michael said, the second he picked up the phone. “Hi honey, you weren’t 
home so--” 
74. “Michael,” she said, interrupting him with her soft voice. “Listen… I’m at my sister’s 
house right now. I can’t make it to our date tonight.” 
75. Michael was immediately disappointed, but he was more worried about why Ashley 
might be cancelling. 
76. “Oh,” he said. “Did something happen? Is your sister okay?” 
77. “She’s fine, I’m…” Ashley sighed. “I got a job offer and I’m going to take it.” 
78. Michael didn’t understand what that had to do with anything. “That’s great, but why--” 
79. “It’s in New York,” Ashley said. “I have to leave in two weeks, so I’m moving out.” 
80. “I hope you understand,” Ashley said, and she hung up the phone. 
81. Michael was stunned; he and Ashley lived across the country from New York, and she 
had to move in two weeks?! 
82. He shook his head in disbelief; he had never been put in a situation like this before.  
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83. He called Ashley back immediately, so they could try to talk about this, but she didn’t 
pick up. 
84. It was a big surprise that Ashley was going to move across the country, but Michael was 
more concerned about how Ashley was acting. 
85. Ashley didn’t respond to any of his texts, either, and after waiting ten minutes, Michael 
decided to drive over to her sister’s house to talk with her. 
86. On his way there, Michael thought about everything he had gone through with Ashley. 
87. He thought about how their relationship was all that he wanted; he had been so hopeful 
that marriage would be in their future.  
88. He didn’t know how Ashley could to keep this from him, when all he wanted was for 
her to be happy. 
89. His car slowly pulled up to the curb outside Ashley’s sister’s house. 
90. His heart was racing, and panic started to set in. 
91. In the blink of an eye, everything he had worked up to in their relationship seemed to be 
disappearing. 
92. Michael gave a gentle knock, hoping not to startle Ashley after the call – but she didn’t 
answer. 
93. He knocked again, this time with a bit more force, in which he heard footsteps 
approaching the door. 
94. To his relief, it was Ashley who opened the door. 
95.  “Hi Michael,” she said. “I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to scare you.”  
96. “Ashley, what’s going on?” he said. “I don’t understand. How long have you known 
about the job?” 
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97. “They told me I would probably get the job a couple weeks ago,” Ashley admitted. 
98. Michael was stunned. “How could you do something like this without letting me know?” 
99. “I always talk to you about everything that’s going on in my life,” Michael continued. 
“You know how important it is to me to share things that make me upset.” 
100. “I just thought that it would be better if I didn’t tell you,” Ashley said, and she refused to 
look Michael in the eye.  
101. She knew that if she looked into his brown eyes, she would feel so much worse about 
herself. 
102. “I love you, Michael, I really do,” she said, as tears began to run down her cheeks. “But 
this is my future we’re talking about here.” 
103. “I can’t believe you, Ashley,” he said, almost yelling. “We were supposed to plan our 
lives together. We promised to tell each other what we were doing, no matter what!”  
104. Ashley quickly leaned in to hug Michael, like she wanted to comfort him, but he turned 
his back toward her, enraged by her decision not to tell him. 
105. He furiously headed down the concrete steps and got back in his car, dialing Chris’s 
number before he reached the end of the street.  
106. He was struggling to fight back the tears in his eyes. 
107. He asked Chris to meet up with him so they could talk; Michael often took comfort in 
letting his feelings out, and Chris was a good listener. 
108.  Chris said he was still at the bar with Jessica and her friends, so Michael headed back in 
that direction. 
109. “Is everything okay, dude?” Chris asked, sounding concerned. 
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110. “I’ll tell you about it when I get there,” Michael said; Chris had always given him the 
best advice, and he hoped this time would be no different. 
111. Twenty minutes later, Michael sat down next to Chris at the bar, trying not to attract the 
attention of Jessica.  
112. Of course, Jessica immediately looked over and exclaimed, “Michael! You look so sad; 
what happened?!” 
113. Michael sighed internally. “I’m having a problem with my girlfriend,” he said sternly. “I 
just wanted to talk to Chris about it.” 
114. “Nooo!” Jessica said. “I give the BEST advice, Michael, I can listen too!”  
115. Michael debated whether or not to include Jessica in the conversation, but he decided 
one more listener couldn’t hurt, especially since Jessica didn’t know Ashley. 
116. He told Chris and Jessica about everything that had happened with Ashley. 
117. “I don’t know what to do,” he finished, staring down at the countertop. “This came out 
of nowhere, and now she has to leave in two weeks?” 
118. “Damn,” Chris said. “That’s so weird; I wonder what’s up with her.” 
119. “I guess she didn’t want to hurt my feelings by telling me, but now I feel like she should 
have just told me. It at least would have given me time to process this and figure 
something out for the both of us.” Michael said. 
120. Jessica looked like she was deep in thought. “So she wants to move across the country 
without you?” Jessica said, and Michael nodded. 
121. “Is that because she doesn’t want to be with you any longer, or because she doesn’t want 
you to have to find a new job and everything?” 
122. Michael hadn’t thought about it like that, and now he felt even worse about the situation. 
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123. “No way,” Chris said, shaking his head. “Ashley talks about him all the time; one time 
she spent an hour telling me about how much she wants a destination wedding. It was 
ridiculous.” 
124. Michael turned to look at Chris. “She talked about us getting married?” 
125. “Bro,” Chris said, “seriously? She talks about that all the time. She definitely still wants 
to be with you.” 
126. “Then she just doesn’t want you to have to move!” Jessica said decisively. “It’s hard for 
her to break up with you, but you already have a great job here, right? She wants you to 
be able to keep that great job and aaaall your friends out here without having to choose 
what you want more!!” 
127. Chris and Jessica both had really good points, and Michael was glad he’d decided to 
include Jessica after all. 
128. Maybe if Jessica learned to be less annoying, he could learn to work with her. 
129. “You look like you know I’m right!” Jessica exclaimed. “Since I was so helpful, can I 
come to your wedding?!” Never mind. 
130. “No,” Michael said, and the same time Chris said, “You could be my date?” 
131. Michael tried to say something about how he and Ashley weren’t going to get married 
for at least a year, but Jessica’s loud “Sure!!!” drowned him out. 
132. “Nice!” Chris said, before turning back to Michael. 
133. “Anyway, dude, I think you need to go back and talk to her about this. She really needs 
you right now, as much as it hurts you knowing that she is leaving soon. You have to go 
back to her!” Chris exclaimed. 
134. Michael quickly left the bar and rushed back to where Ashley was. 
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135. Michael was already happy living with Ashley in San Francisco, and he knew Ashley 
felt the same way – but he also knew how important her career was to her. 
136. Ashley had vowed to help find a cure for cancer after growing up with Emily. 
137. Emily was Ashley’s best friend in elementary school, and she’d been diagnosed with 
leukemia when the two of them were eight. 
138. Thankfully, Emily was in complete remission, and she was working as a fire-
breather on a cruise ship. 
139. Last summer, Ashley and Michael had gone on a cruise that Emily was working on, and 
it was one of Michael’s favorite times with Ashley. 
140. Michael took a few deep breaths once he was outside Ashley’s sister’s house again. 
141. He’d been thinking about their future on the way over, and he knew what he wanted to 
do; he just had to convince Ashley. 
142. Michael knocked on the door a couple times, and Ashley opened it almost immediately. 
143. It looked like she’d been crying more, and Michael felt heartbroken. 
144. Ashley invited him inside, and the first thing he said was, “I’m sorry about the way I 
stormed off like that, Ashley. I was just so overwhelmed.” 
145. “It’s okay,” Ashley said. “I know you didn’t mean it.” 
146. “So what do you wanna do?” Michael said. “You have to leave soon. We really need to 
figure this out.” 
147. “You know this has always been my dream.” Ashley said, looking down at her socks. “I 
promised Emily I would help her.”  




149. Ashley jerked up and stared at him. “No way,” she said. “You’d be doing so much, 
Michael. I can’t let you decide your future all because of me. Your future is just as 
important as mine.” 
150. “I’m serious,” Michael said. “I promised you I would always be there for you, 
remember? We’ll figure something out. I can get a job just like I did here, or start up a 
business.” 
151. Ashley looked hesitant. “I’d feel so guilty if you changed your entire career because of 
me…” 
152. “Well, I love you, Ashley,” Michael said. “You’re so important to me. And there’s a lot 
of job opportunities in my field, you know?” 
153. Ashley smiled, just a little bit, and that was enough for Michael. “If you’re sure, 
Michael,” she said. 
154. “I could go ahead with the move first, then we’ll figure out our living situation once 
you’re there? I love you, too,” she said excitedly, with her sweet, high-pitched voice. 
155. Michael’s eyes lit up. “That sounds perfect!” Michael exclaimed, grabbing Ashley to 
give her a hug. 
156. Michael was so excited for his future with Ashley. 
157. Even if some things still seemed unsure, this was what he really wanted – staying with 
Ashley for the rest of his life, no matter where that took him. 
158. Michael spent the next two weeks helping Ashley pack, before Ashley said her 
goodbyes to her friends and family and flew to New York. 
159. Michael stayed behind for a couple more months, taking care of any financial matters 
that were left in order before the big move. 
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160. Chris gladly helped him pack the rest of Michael and Ashley’s apartment up, even when 
he found Michael sleeping on a pile of moving boxes from all of the exhaustion. 
161. Michael was a little sad he had to move away from Chris – and Jessica, even, who 
slowly started to pay attention to his directions – but he knew he could always Skype 
with Chris when he wanted to hang out. 
162. It finally came to the point where the moving truck was fully packed and Michael was 
ready to leave their old life behind, awaiting all the adventures that him and Ashley 
would share. 
163. Michael was so eager to move back in with the love of his life, and he spent the entire 
five-day drive thinking about their future. 
164. He was so relieved that things had worked out with Ashley and her new job. 
165. Ashley was away at work, so Michael decided to make a few small touches to the 
apartment before she got home. 
166. He bought her roses, candles, and made a delicious pasta dish that he knew Ashley 
would love. 
167. An hour later Ashley finally called Michael to let him know she was coming.  
168. “I’m on my way!” Ashley exclaimed. “I’m so excited to finally move back in together 
again, Michael.”  
169. “I can’t wait to see you,” Michael said, smiling brightly. “I hope you’re hungry!” 
170. Once Ashley got back to the apartment, Michael treated Ashley to a special night in with 
a romantic, relaxing dinner. 
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171. Michael felt so comfortable and was beyond happy that he was able to stay with the 
most important person in his life, especially because of how important Ashley’s research 
was to her. 
172. “You were right, you know,” Ashley said over dinner. “Everything worked out. I’m so 
grateful to have someone like you in my life.” 
173. “I told you it would be worth it.” Michael said. 




Appendix B: Stereotype Ratings 
A group of undergraduates rated how much each characteristic is considered a stereotype of six 
groups: heterosexual men, heterosexual women, gay men, lesbian women, bisexual men, and 
bisexual women. 
 




d. interested in sex/sexually active 
e. competitive 
2. Stereotypes for five groups: 
a. has a lot of female friends (not heterosexual men) 
b. physically affectionate (not heterosexual men) 
c. conventionally attractive (not bisexual women) 
3. Stereotypes for only one group: 
a. introverted (heterosexual men) 
b. untidy (heterosexual men) 
c. acts as a follower (heterosexual women) 
d. emotionally calm/feelings are never hurt/hides emotions and feelings/not 
emotional/emotionally cold (heterosexual men) 
e. conventionally unattractive (lesbians) 
f. not at all fashionable (heterosexual men) 
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g. timid (heterosexual women) 
h. not competitive (heterosexual women) 
4. Feminine stereotypes, i.e., stereotypes for gay men and heterosexual women (and 
potentially bisexual individuals, but not lesbians or heterosexual men): 
a. tidy/neat 
b. emotional/feelings are easily hurt 
c. avoids being athletic/bad at sports 
d. fashionable/wears flashy or feminine clothes 
e. high-pitched voice  
f. physically thin 
g. open about emotions and feelings/emotionally warm 
h. submissive/quiet 
5. Masculine stereotypes, i.e., stereotypes for lesbians and heterosexual men (and 
potentially for bisexual individuals, but not gay men or heterosexual women): 
a. dominant/acts as a leader 
b. has a lot of male friends 
c. athletic/good at sports 
d. wears masculine or boring clothes 
e. deep or rough voice 
f. physically overweight 




Appendix C: Memory Test 
This is the male main character/female romantic partner version of the memory test. The correct 
answers are bolded; multiple-choice questions and answers will be in randomized order. Some 
question details may change depending on recommendations by the Institutional Review Board 
and my committee. 
 








2. Describe the relationship between Michael and Ashley in complete sentences. 
____ 
3. Describe how Michael looked. 
____ 
4. Described how Michael acted. 
___ 




6. Describe how Ashley acted. 
____ 















10. What surprised you the most in this story? 
____ 
11. Who was your favorite character, and why? 
____ 




1  Strongly disagree 
2  Disagree 
3  Neither agree nor disagree 
4  Agree 
5  Strongly agree 
 
13. I liked Michael and what Michael did in the story.    1   2   3   4   5 
14. I feel like I identify with Michael.      1   2   3   4   5 
15. I liked Ashley and what Ashley did in the story.     1   2   3   4   5 
16. I feel like I identify with Ashley.       1   2   3   4   5 
17. I enjoyed reading this story.       1   2   3   4   5 
18. I thought this story was boring.       1   2   3   4   5 
Reading comprehension questions: 
 
1. Ashley is Michael's... 





Valid Girlfriend 102 99.0 99.0 99.0 
Wife 0 0.0 0.0 99.0 
Sister 0 0.0 0.0 99.0 
This information was 
not provided 
1 1.0 1.0 100.0 
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Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
2. Chris is Michael's... 





Valid Best friend 100 97.1 97.1 97.1 
Brother 0 0.0 0.0 97.1 
Coworker 0 0.0 0.0 97.1 
This information was 
not provided 
3 2.9 2.9 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
3. Jessica is Michael's... 





Valid Coworker 103 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Friend 0 0.0 0.0 97.1 
Sister 0 0.0 0.0 97.1 
This information was 
not provided 
3 2.9 2.9 100.0 




4. Emily is Ashley's... 





Valid Best friend 75 72.8 72.8 72.8 
Sister 23 22.3 22.3 95.1 
Coworker 1 1.0 1.0 96.1 
This information was 
not provided 
4 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
5. How did Michael describe Chris' hair? 





Valid Curly black hair 66 64.1 64.1 64.1 
Frizzy brown hair 16 15.5 15.5 79.6 
Dark buzzcut 7 6.8 6.8 86.4 
This information was 
not provided 
14 13.6 13.6 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
6. How did Michael describe Ashley's hair? 







Valid Frizzy brown hair 67 65.0 65.0 65.0 
Curly black hair 12 11.7 11.7 76.7 
Dark buzzcut 3 2.9 2.9 79.6 
This information was 
not provided 
21 20.4 20.4 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
7. Where did Michael and Ashley meet? 





Valid In a college class 89 86.4 86.4 86.4 
At a carnival 7 6.8 6.8 93.2 
At Michael's job 1 1.0 1.0 94.2 
This information was 
not provided 
6 5.8 5.8 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
8. Why is Ashley moving to New York? 





Valid For a new job 100 97.1 97.1 97.1 
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To take care of her best 
friend 
2 1.9 1.9 99.0 
This information was 
not provided 
1 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
9. Chris works as a... 





Valid Car mechanic 6 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Hairdresser 0 0.0 0.0 5.8 
Business owner 4 3.9 3.9 9.7 
This information was 
not provided 
93 90.3 90.3 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
10. Ashley's sister is... 





Valid A step-sister 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
A half-sister 4 3.9 3.9 5.8 
Adopted 1 1.0 1.0 6.8 
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This information was 
not provided 
96 93.2 93.2 100.0 




11. Michael works as a... 





Valid Business coordinator 87 84.5 84.5 84.5 
Hairdresser 1 1.0 1.0 85.4 
This information was 
not provided 
15 14.6 14.6 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
12. What is Michael's hobby? 





Valid Swimming 97 94.2 94.2 94.2 
Ballet 0 0.0 0.0 94.2 
Hockey 0 0.0 0.0 94.2 
This information was 
not provided 
6 5.8 5.8 100.0 
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Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
13. Ashley works as a ___6 
 Cancer researcher 
 Car mechanic 
 Registered nurse 
 This information was not provided 
 
14. Does Ashley care about keeping the apartment clean? 





Valid She cares somewhat; 
she's a little messy 
63 61.2 61.2 61.2 
She cares a lot; she's 
very tidy 
2 1.9 1.9 63.1 
She doesn't care at all; 
she's very messy 
11 10.7 10.7 73.8 
This information was 
not provided 
27 26.2 26.2 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
Stereotypically “feminine” questions: 
 




15. How does Michael describe his physique? 





Valid Skinnier than average 94 91.3 91.3 91.3 
About average weight 4 3.9 3.9 95.1 
Heavier than average 1 1.0 1.0 96.1 
This information was 
not provided 
4 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
16. Does Michael share his feelings with Ashley and Chris? 





Valid Michael is very open 
about his feelings 
85 82.5 82.5 82.5 
Michael is somewhat 
open about his feelings 
14 13.6 13.6 96.1 
This information was 
not provided 
4 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
17. What does Ashley sound like? 
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Valid Ashley has a soft, 
high-pitched voice 
51 49.5 49.5 49.5 
Ashley has a kind, 
loving voice 
35 34.0 34.0 83.5 
Ashley has a low, rough 
voice 
1 1.0 1.0 84.5 
This information was 
not provided 
16 15.5 15.5 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
18. Is Ashley emotional? 





Valid Ashley cries and gets 
upset easily 
39 37.9 37.9 37.9 
Ashley doesn't cry 
often 
15 14.6 14.6 52.4 
Michael has never seen 
Ashley get upset 
2 1.9 1.9 54.4 
This information was 
not provided 
47 45.6 45.6 100.0 
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Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
Stereotypically “masculine” questions: 
 
19. How athletic is Michael? 





Valid Michael is very 
athletic and exercises 
frequently 
70 68.0 68.0 68.0 
Michael is somewhat 
athletic and exercises 
sometimes 
23 22.3 22.3 90.3 
Michael is not athletic 
at all and rarely 
exercises 
1 1.0 1.0 91.3 
This information was 
not provided 
9 8.7 8.7 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
20. What kind of personality does Michael have? 







Valid Michael is dominant 
and acts as a leader 
60 58.3 58.3 58.3 
Michael is not 
particularly dominant 
or submissive 
13 12.6 12.6 70.9 
Michael is submissive 
and acts as a follower 
6 5.8 5.8 76.7 
This information was 
not provided 
24 23.3 23.3 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
21. How does Michael describe Ashley’s hair? 





Valid Short brown hair 63 61.2 61.2 61.2 
Long dark hair 4 3.9 3.9 65.0 
Medium-length brown 
hair 
19 18.4 18.4 83.5 
This information was 
not provided 
17 16.5 16.5 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
22. What kind of personality does Ashley have? 
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Valid Ashley is very 
competitive and wants 
to win 
66 64.1 64.1 64.1 
Ashley doesn’t care 
about winning 
7 6.8 6.8 70.9 
Ashley isn’t 
competitive at all and 
likes when Michael 
wins 
1 1.0 1.0 71.8 
This information was 
not provided 
29 28.2 28.2 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
“Information not provided” questions: 
 
23. What jewelry does Michael mention wearing? 





Valid A wedding ring 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Earrings 2 1.9 1.9 2.9 
A watch 14 13.6 13.6 16.5 
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This information was 
not provided 
86 83.5 83.5 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
24. What does Michael like to wear? 





Valid Flashy, fashionable 
clothes 
12 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Clothes from the thrift 
store 
5 4.9 4.9 16.5 
Boring, masculine 
clothes 
13 12.6 12.6 29.1 
This information was 
not provided 
73 70.9 70.9 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
25. What is Ashley's hobby? 





Valid Swimming 9 8.7 8.7 8.7 
Ballet 2 1.9 1.9 10.7 
Hockey 1 1.0 1.0 11.7 
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This information was 
not provided 
91 88.3 88.3 100.0 
Total 103 100.0 100.0  
 
26. How does Michael describe Ashley's physique? 





Valid Skinnier than average 5 4.9 4.9 4.9 
About average weight 27 26.2 26.2 31.1 
Heavier than average 10 9.7 9.7 40.8 
This information was 
not provided 
61 59.2 59.2 100.0 





Appendix D: Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
Your answers are completely anonymous, and we appreciate your honesty on this questionnaire. 
Answer each item by selecting the number after each question as follows. 
 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
 
1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right   1 2 3 4 5 
2. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am fully in control of my own fate      1 2 3 4 5 
4. I never regret my decisions       1 2 3 4 5 
5. I am a completely rational person      1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am very confident in my judgements     1 2 3 4 5 
7. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me   1 2 3 4 5 
8. I sometimes tell lies, if I have to      1 2 3 4 5 
9. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught   1 2 3 4 5 
11. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back  1 2 3 4 5 
12. I have never dropped litter on the street     1 2 3 4 5 
13. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about   1 2 3 4 5 
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14. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick 
1 2 3 4 5 




Appendix E: Homophobia Scale 
This questionnaire is designed to measure your thoughts, feelings, and behaviors with regards to 
homosexuality. It is not a test, so there are no right or wrong answers. Your answers are 
completely anonymous, and we appreciate your honesty on this questionnaire. Answer each item 
by selecting the number after each question as follows: 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
 
1. Gay people make me nervous. 1 2 3 4 5  
2. Gay people deserve what they get. 1 2 3 4 5  
3. Homosexuality is acceptable to me. 1 2 3 4 5  
4. If I discovered a friend was gay I would end the friendship. 1 2 3 4 5  
5. I think homosexual people should not work with children. 1 2 3 4 5  
6. I make derogatory remarks about gay people. 1 2 3 4 5  
7. I enjoy the company of gay people. 1 2 3 4 5  
8. Marriage between homosexual individuals is acceptable. 1 2 3 4 5  
9. I make derogatory remarks like “faggot” or “queer” to people I suspect are gay. 1 2 3 4 5  
10. It does not matter to me whether my friends are gay or straight. 1 2 3 4 5  
11. It would not upset me if I learned that a close friend was homosexual. 1 2 3 4 5  
12. Homosexuality is immoral. 1 2 3 4 5  
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13. I tease and make jokes about gay people. 1 2 3 4 5  
14. I feel that you cannot trust a person who is homosexual. 1 2 3 4 5  
15. I fear homosexual persons will make sexual advances towards me. 1 2 3 4 5  
16. Organizations which promote gay rights are necessary. 1 2 3 4 5  
17. I have damaged property of gay persons, such as “keying” their cars. 1 2 3 4 5  
18. I would feel comfortable having a gay roommate. 1 2 3 4 5  
19. I would hit a homosexual for coming on to me. 1 2 3 4 5  
20. Homosexual behavior should not be against the law. 1 2 3 4 5  
21. I avoid gay individuals. 1 2 3 4 5  
22. It does not bother me to see two homosexual people together in public. 1 2 3 4 5  
23. When I see a gay person I think, “What a waste.” 1 2 3 4 5 
24. When I meet someone I try to find out if he/she is gay. 1 2 3 4 5 




Appendix F: Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men Scale 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Agree 
5 Strongly agree 
 
26. I think male homosexuals are disgusting. 1 2 3 4 5  
27. Male homosexuality is a perversion. 1 2 3 4 5 
28. Male homosexuality is a natural expression of sexuality in men. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. Sex between two men is just plain wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
30. Male homosexuality is merely a different kind of lifestyle that should not be condemned.  
1 2 3 4 5 
31. I think lesbians are disgusting. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. Female homosexuality is a perversion. 1 2 3 4 5 
33. Female homosexuality is a natural expression of sexuality in women. 1 2 3 4 5 
34. Sex between two women is just plain wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
35. Female homosexuality is merely a different kind of lifestyle that should not be condemned.  




Appendix G: Implicit Association Task Materials 


















3. Words sorted as referring to “gay people”:  





d. gay men 
e. lesbians 
4. Words sorted as referring to “straight people”:  
a. straight people 
b. heterosexual 
c. straight 
d. straight men 




Appendix H: LGBT Knowing Questionnaire 
Answer the following questions about people you personally know, regardless of your own 
identity. 
 
 1  Agree 
 2  Neither agree nor disagree/I’m not sure 
 3  Disagree 
 
1. I have met someone who is lesbian, gay, bisexual, etc.     1   2   3 
2. I have met someone who is transgender.       1   2   3 
3. I am friends with someone who is lesbian, gay, bisexual, etc.    1   2   3 
4. I am friends with someone who is transgender.      1   2   3 
5. I have a family member who is lesbian, gay, bisexual, etc.    1   2   3 




Appendix I: Demographic Questionnaire 
1. What is your age? 
____ 




□ Other: ____ 
3. What is your race? 
□ Black/African-American 
□ Asian/Asian-American/Middle-Eastern 
□ White/European  
□ Native American 
□ Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
□ Other: ____ 
4. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
5. Is English your native language? 
□ Yes 
□ No, I have been speaking English for this many years: ____ 







□ Other: ___ 
□ Prefer not to answer/I’m not sure 
7. Are you transgender? (People who are transgender identify as a gender different from the 
gender they were assigned at birth. If you’re not sure what this means, select “No.”) 
□ Yes, I am transgender/non-binary 
□ No, I am not transgender/non-binary 
□ Prefer not to answer/I’m not sure 





□ Graduate student 
9. What is your major? 
____ 






11. What is your present religion? 
□ Protestant Christianity 
□ Catholic Christianity 
□ Mormonism/LDS 
□ Judaism 
□ Other: ____ 
12. How would you describe your political views? 
□ Very liberal or left-wing 
□ Liberal or left-wing 
□ Moderate 
□ Conservative or right-wing 




Appendix J: Qualitative Coding Instructions 
(1) CHARACTER NAMES: 
We asked participants to list off all the characters they remembered. You’re coding based on 
which characters they remembered. 
• The first main character is Michael/Sarah (remember – they’re the same character!) and 
the second main character is Andrew/Ashley (same character!). The other characters are 
Chris and Jessica, and there were also a few very minor ones (see below). 
• If they include either Michael or Sarah (just one, not both!) in the list of character names, 
put 1 in the box which corresponds to Michael/Sarah. If they don’t mention Michael, and 
they also don’t mention Sarah, put a 0 in that box. 
o 1 = “yes, they included Michael or Sarah.” 
o 0 = “no, they didn’t include Michael or Sarah.” 
• Do this for all four characters (Michael/Sarah, Andrew/Ashley, Chris, Jessica). 
• Minor characters: Put the count of any mentions of these minor characters: Emily, 
Michael/Sarah’s mother, or Andrew/Ashley’s sister. For example, if they listed all of 
them, put 3; if they only mentioned “Emily”, put 1; if they listed none of them, put 0. 
• Other: If they mention any other characters not mentioned above, put a 1. Otherwise, put 
a 0. 
NOTES: The order of the characters in each list doesn’t matter. Also, if a name is misspelled, 




We asked participants “What race were each of the characters?” and had them put in an answer 
for Michael/Sarah, Andrew/Ashley, Chris, and Jessica. Insert a code number for each character 
using the following code. For example, if they responded that Michael was White, Andrew was 
Hispanic, Chris was Black, and Jessica was Cuban, you would code them as: 3, 7, 1, 7 
• Didn’t put a race (e.g., “N/A,” “American,” “Brown”, “Unsure”) = 0 
• Black/African-American = 1 
• Asian/Asian-American/Middle-Eastern (including Cambodian) = 2 
• White/European = 3 
• Native American = 4 
• Other/Mixed/Put multiple races = 5 
• Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander = 6 
• Hispanic/Latino/Cuban = 7 
 
(3) HAIR COLOR: 
We asked participants, “What hair color did each of the characters have?” – insert a code number 
for each character (based on the participant’s response). NOTE: If you code this as 5 for “Other”, 
use “Review” and “New Comment” to add an explanation in a comment box. 
• Didn’t put an answer = 0 
• Black/Dark = 1 
• Blonde = 2 
• Brown/Light brown/Brunette = 3 
• Red/Strawberry blonde = 4 




(4) SEXUAL ORIENTATION: 
We asked participants, “What sexual orientation were each of the characters?” – insert a code 
number for each character (based on the participant’s response). NOTE: If you code this as 4 for 
“Other”, use “Review” and “New Comment” to add an explanation in a comment box. 
• Didn’t put an answer = 0 
• Straight/Heterosexual/Likely straight = 1 
• Gay/Lesbian/Homosexual = 2 
• Bisexual = 3 
• Other/Put multiple choices = 4 
• Put male or female  = 5 
 
(5) SURPRISE: 
We asked participants, “What surprised you the most in the story?” Remember, Michael and 
Sarah are the same character; also, Andrew and Ashley are the same character. NOTE: If you 
code this as 9 for “Other”, use “Review” and “New Comment” to add an explanation in a 
comment box. 
• Didn’t put an answer = 0 
• Andrew/Ashley leaving or hiding a secret or being distant/rude = 1 
• Michael/Sarah moving with Andrew/Ashley or choosing/forgiving them = 2 
• The characters have different personalities or expectations from their relationship = 3 
• Michael/Sarah liking or listening to Jessica = 4 
• Jessica being helpful or being involved in the story = 5 
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• The story having a happy ending = 6 
• Sexual orientation = 7 
• Andrew/Ashley curing cancer or any mention of Emily/fire breathing/cruise ship = 8 
• Other = 9 
 
(6) FAVORITE CHARACTER: 
We asked participants, “Who was your favorite character, and why?” Since this is a two-part 
question, you’ll be putting in two numbers, one for the character and one for the reasoning. So, 
make sure that you have two numbers (e.g., 3 4 corresponds to “Chris” and “Relatable”). 
CHARACTER: 
• Michael/Sarah = 1 
• Andrew/Ashley = 2 
• Chris = 3 
• Jessica = 4 
• Other/Picked multiple characters = 5 
REASONING: 
• Didn’t put a reason = 0 
• Seems like good friend/Gave good advice/Likable = 1 
• Had good intentions/Cared about others = 2 
• Wanted to find a solution/Willing to change = 3 
• Relatable/Reminded me of myself or a friend = 4 
• Other “personality trait” reasons = 5 
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• Other = 6 
 
(7) LEAST FAVORITE: 
We asked participants, “What was your least favorite part of the story?” – use the code number 
that best matches their response. NOTE: If you code this as 8 for “Other” (or are unsure how to 
code this), use “Review” and “New Comment” to add an explanation in a comment box.  
• Didn’t put an answer = 0 
• Andrew/Ashley hiding information from Michael/Sarah = 1 
• The ending or Michael/Sarah moving to New York with Andrew/Ashley = 2 
• Michael/Sarah getting angry or storming off = 3 
• Jessica or Chris asking out Jessica = 4 
• How Michael/Sarah judged or talked about or complained about Jessica = 5 
• The beginning of the story = 6 
• The story being cliché = 7 
• Other = 8 
 
(8) PHYSICAL APPEARANCE: 
We asked participants, “Describe how Michael/Sarah looked.” Your job is to code what types of 




• First, read the participant’s description of the character. For every trait mentioned, 
determine which category it falls into. You are counting the number of ways each trait is 
described. 
• EXAMPLE 1: “He was tall and skinny with brown eyes.” 
o Here, there are 3 traits: tall (which reflects height), skinny (which reflects physical 
build), and brown eyes (which reflects eye color). 
o So you would put a 1 for height, 1 for physical build, and 1 for eye color 
categories, but put a 0 for the rest of the traits listed in the spreadsheet.  
• EXAMPLE 2: “Shorter hair that's black, shorter in height, slim but athletic build 
(basically swimmer's body type), African descendant.” 
o Here, there are 6 traits: shorter hair (hair length), black hair (hair color), shorter in 
height (height), slim but athletic build (physical build x 2), African (race). 
o While there are 6 traits, 2 of them are describing the same thing: physical build. 
Because of this, put a 1 for hair length, 1 for hair color, 1 for height, and 1 for 
race; but put 2 for physical build. Put a 0 for the rest. 
• NOTE: The story described Michael/Sarah as “looking just like the character’s 
Cambodian mother,” so you may see references to this in the description – code this for 
“mother/Cambodian”.  
• If the participant says they do not remember anything, put a 1 in the (participant doesn’t 
remember) box. 
• NOTE: If you use the code “Other” for any traits that were recalled (i.e., a trait does not 
fit any of the listed categories), use “Review” and “New Comment” to add an explanation 
in a comment box.  
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• Finally, once you have coded all of the traits that were recalled, you need to rate the 
participant’s overall description on two measures: 
o How negative or positive is the overall description? 1 = purely negative, 3 = 
neutral, 5 = purely positive. 
o How certain does the participant seem about their description/recall? 1 = very 
uncertain, 3 = neutral, 5 = very certain. If the participant just lists off traits with 
no tone to convey certainty, then rate that as a 5, because there is nothing to 
convey any uncertainty. 
 
Repeat the same for Andrew/Ashley’s description. 
 
(9) CHARACTER BEHAVIOR: 
 
We also asked participants, “Describe how Michael acted.” This turned out to be a very general 
question – some participants described Michael’s behavior, while others described his 
personality characteristics or his emotions. Your task it to determine what category each part of 
the descriptions fits into. 
 
• Read the participant’s description of the character. For every trait mentioned, determine 
which category it falls into. You are counting the number of ways each trait is described. 
• EXAMPLE: “Towards Jessica, the new employee, Michael acted very annoyed towards 
her due to her lack of attention as he was training her. He would roll her eyes at 
everything she would say, but still masked his annoyance with a straightforward tone. 
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Towards Chris, he acted very open and happy and communicative as that is his best 
friend. Towards Ashley, Michael was deeply in love with her and would do anything for 
her.” 
o First, find the emotions in the description – this example listed annoyed, happy, 
and in love, so put 3 in the “emotions” box. 
o Next, look for specific behaviors in the description – this is anything the character 
actually did. In this example, it was reported that Michael “rolled his eyes” and 
“masked his annoyance.” Both of these are specific actions, so they count as 
behaviors. Put a 2 in the “behavior” box. 
o After that, look for personality descriptions. In the example, “he acted very open” 
is not a specific action – it describes how Michael generally was as a person. 
“Open” is a personality trait describing Michael. The same applies to 
“communicative.” For this example, you would put a 2 in the “personality” box. 
o Finally, look to see if there is anything else described that does not quite fit as an 
emotion, specific behavior, nor as a personality trait. In this example, “Towards 
Ashley, Michael would do anything for her.” This is not an emotion, it is not a 
specific behavior (because the participant is just describing what Michael would 
generally do), but “doing anything for his girlfriend” also is not a personality trait. 
Because this does not fit into the other three categories, put a 1 in the “other” box. 
• NOTE: If you code this as “Other”, use “Review” and “New Comment” to add an 
explanation in a comment box.  
• Finally (as you did above), rate how negative or positive the overall description seems: 1 








We also asked participants, “Describe the relationship between Michael/Sarah and 
Andrew/Ashley.” Your job is to take this written description and code it for what attributes 
participants used to describe the relationship.  
 
• For example, you will put a 1 in the “Dating/Relationship” box if a particular description 
includes the attribute that they are “dating” OR “in a relationship” OR a similar attribute 
(e.g., synonym or similar description). 
o Be careful with this, though. For example, “they live together” does not get coded 
as “Dating/Relationship” because “Living together/Cohabiting” is a different 
category that you can code. 
• If the description does not specifically say that the characters are dating or in a 
relationship, put a 0 in that box. Think of 1 as “yes, they mentioned this attribute” and 0 
as “no, they did not mention this attribute.” 
• EXAMPLE: “They are dating with a great potential of getting married one day. They live 
together and love each other very much.” 
o You would code “dating” as a 1 for Dating/Relationship, “potential of getting 
married” as a 1 for Want marriage, “live together” as a 1 for Living 
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together/Cohabiting, and “love each other” as a 1 for In love/Romantic. Put a 0 in 
the boxes for the other attributes that were not described. 
• NOTE: If you code this as “Other” (or are unsure how to code this), use “Review” and 
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